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Abstract

Experimental economics is the newest tool available to improve the research of
economists. The first chapter reviews the methods that experimentation employs. The
review is important for understanding the construction and running of experiments as
well as the criticisms. The second chapter illustrates the methods through an example
experiment of the AJlais Paradox. The third chapter develops an original experiment
involving the pricing decisions of gasoline by owners of adjacent gasoline stations.
Anecdotal evidence shows that gas stations located in close proximity to one another
often have different prices. This result contradicts existing oligopoly and duopoly theory.
An experiment is developed to examine a new set of assumptions that more accurately
The results reflect that a more accurate
reflect consumer and firm behavior.
characterization of behavioral tendencies not only satisfies the observed evidence but the
The final chapter addresses the criticisms of
dynamics of duopolies as well.
experimentation within economics and concludes that careful experimentation can add a
tremendous amount to economic research.
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CHAPTERl

The Discipline of Experimental Economics

Some disciplines are inherently experimental, bur others (including
economics) are not.
- Daniel Friedman and Shyam Sunder

Experimental economIcs IS the most recent tool to emerge in the field of
economics. The increased focus on experimentation and the greater usefulness of the
results have propelled the tremendous growth of experimental economics over the past
thirty years. The elements of experimental economics must be understood in order to
examine how experiments contribute to research. The focus of this chapter is to define
experimental economics, relate its importance within the larger discipline of economics,
investigate the methodologies used in experimental economics, and identify some special
considerations for field-specific experiments.

1.1 Denning Experimental Economics
Economics, unlike the natural sciences, has only recently come to rely on
experiments to supply deeper insights into research.

Previously, economics has only

relied on empirical work while the natural sciences have always relied on both empirical
and experimental evidence.

Experiments have a wide array of uses, not limjted to

theorists because of the applicability of the results to other &sciplines.

Within

economics, experiments have gained importance because they help economists modify
and improve existing theory. The ability for the results to be easily presented to decision
makers as evidence for a policy initiative has led to the growing imponance of
experiments outside of economics.

Observed human behavior holds greater relevance

for policy makers because it provides information on theoretical behavior that enables the
decision makers to construct more effective policy measures.

The definition of

experimental economics must encompass the various uses of the results.
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Experimental econonucs

IS

economic phenomenon from which
unobservable in nature.

The creaTion of an environment simulaTing an
10

observe human behavior thaT might otherwise be

For the theorist, the use of experimentation is focused on

identifying flaws in existing theory, not creating theory.

Experiments test the

assumptions regarding human behavior and that serves as the backbone of theories; they
test whether the predicted behavior can be observed in an environment that simulates the
premises of the experiment. The application of experimental results within economics is
described by the following:
"Theory organizes knowledge and helps to predict behavior in new
situations ... Conversely, data collection and analysis often tum up
regularities that are not explained by existing theory. Such
empirical regularities spur refinement of theory ... ")
The ability for empirical evidence to shed light on gray areas in existing theory allows
economists to refine their models and give the models greater explanatory power. The
underlying assumptions used to support a given theory gain credibility when
experimental evidence provides results consistent with those predicted by the theory.
The use of experiments by theorists can be separated into three categories:
investigating issues with one clear theory; investigating issues with two contrasting
theories; and investigating issues with no clear theoretical (an ambiguous) prediction.
When there is one clear theory, experiments can find systematic regularities not
accounted for in the theory.

The experiments reveal whether or not the underlying

premises of the theory are justified. An experiment simulates an event where theory has
made a prediction and can strengthen or weaken the relationship between the theory and
the fundamentals on which the theory is based. When human behavior in the experiment
agrees with what was predicted by the theory, the assumptions on which the theory was
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based gam credibility.

It is this ability to observe the relationship between the

assumptions and the theory that make experimentation powerful.
When there are multiple theories providing explanations for an economic event,
experimental economics assumes a different role. Competing theories predict different
outcomes to the same economic event. Some utilize the same set of assumptions but
many do nol.

The data collected in the replication of the event can help identify

conditions where each theory holds.

Experimental evidence can also help recognize

additional cases or premises needed to select the proper theory. A further possibility is
that the results of the experiment will provide contradictory evidence to the underlying
premises of one of the theories. In this instance, experimental data do not disprove one
theory over the other; the results instead provide new information as to the applicability
of the theory. Experiments outline specific cases, not general cases, so the contradictory
evidence can only be applied to the tested condition. not all possible situations.
Experimental evidence can bring clarity to competing theories.
When no theory exists. experimental economics serves the purpose of providing
additional data to discern trends in behavior.

Experiments are not a method for

establishing a theory. merely a way to observe actions in the established environment.
Control of the environment and access to the participants enables the experimenter to
observe variables of interest in the laboratory.

These variables are often more

challenging, if not impossible, to observe in the natural environment.

The observed

behavior and additional data can help theorists engineer new paths for studying an
economic problem.

The field of experimental economics provides an additional
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mechanism for theorists to gain access to more and better information. This increased
infonnation may generate ideas for a series of premises on which to build a theory.
Each of these cases for the use of experiments within economics plays a vital role
from the theorists' standpoint. However, the real world applicability of the results to
policy makers also warrants consideration.

The evidence collected through an

experiment can provide persuasive evidence for an economist trying to influence a policy
maker. Many economic theories are difficult to apply in their general form to possible
real world situations. Experiments provide not only the scenario for an event but also
insight into what behavior might ensue. The ability to isolate an aspect or variable of a
model that might not otherwise be observable in the natural environment provides
tangible evidence that is more compelling than a theoretical prediction. Policy makers
can be influenced by detailed evidence from the laboratory.
experimental evidence can be more compelling than

Therefore it holds that

theoretical predictions in

determining policy.
Experimental methods offer economists a new mechanism to enlarge the data
from which to perform empirical work.

As Friedman and Sunder note, "traditionally,

observations from naturally occurring economic phenomena were the only source of data
to stimulate revision of theory.,,2 Experimental economics provides an environment to
study economic phenomena and to observe human behavior. The environment increases
the observable data making the results from experimentation valuable in determining the
extent to which theoretic predictions are based on the correct assumptions.
Theoretical economics predictS the actions during an economic event based on a
set of assumptions or premises about behavior (human, market, etc.). As the definition

5
states, experimental econonucs observes human behavior during laboratory-created
economic phenomena that replicate the set of assumptions cited by the theory.

The

results of the experiment establish the extent to which the theory is based on sound
prerruses.

The experiment allows economists to observe more detailed and obscure

aspects of the theory and its underlying assumptions. When the results of the experiment
reflect those predicted by theory. it implies that the theory was derived from sound
prerruses of human behavior; the theory itself, however, is not directly proven. This
evidence can be compelling within the discipline as economists refine theories, and
outside the discipline as policy makers adjust decisions based on experimental evidence.
Condensing the different components of experimental economics into a single
definition should facilitate the reader's understanding of why experimental economics
has gained so much recognition over the past four decades and to assist in the coming
section of the methodologies of experimentation. It is important to note here that not all
economists find value in experiments (this topic will be addressed in more detail later).
The definition only identifies experimental economics; it does not determine why or how
well experiments are conducted. In order to corne up with a litmus test for experiments
of value, a concise method becomes essential.

1.2 Methodological Overview
Certain fields within economics lend themselves to experiments more than others.
A dependable method is necessary to assist economists in their efforts to improve
research by means of experimentation. The definition strives to identify experimental
economics and its components; the methodology strives to develop the framework for
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successful and valuable experiments.

The following is an

overview of the

methodological elements necessary for perfonning experiments in economics.
Much like the work of purely theoretical economists, the results of experiments
must withstand the scrutiny of naysayers. Other economists must be able to understand
the work and procedures.

Confirmation of the results occurs when other economists

review the prior work and are able to reconstruct the experiment and make similar
observations. Unlike the natural sciences, it is impossible to replicate the results exactly,
but economists can compare results looking for similar outcomes. The data are often
different in experimental replications, but the economic outcomes (dynamic, equilibrium,
etc.) are similar. This adds credibility to an experiment. An experiment is said to be of

value when the procedures and results withstand the criticism of other economists and
when the conclusions drawn from the experiment add

[0

the existing body of knowledge

of the field. Economists trying to revise experiments or identify other possible variables
of interest rely on previous experiments. It is prudent therefore that experiments be well
documented and of value so that researchers preparing subsequent experiments in the
area can depend on the results. The ability to review and understand past work is vital to
the research process.
There are three fundamentals in the method for performing experiments
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economics: the relevant areas in economics that lend themselves to experimentation; the
methodological elements that form experiments and ultimately influence the results; and
finaJly field specific considerations needed in the design of experiments. Ingrained in
much of the discussion of the methods for performing experiments is the history that
precedes the recent or current work. Representative works 3 credited with influencing the
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development of experimental econonucs are reviewed throughout this section.

An

experimental economist must understand each factor in the method in order to produce an
experiment of value. It is the lack of a universal method that draws some of the criticism
to the field of experimental economics. This section aims to remedy that problem by
creating an outline of the areas of economics that lend themselves to experimentation and
the various methodological steps necessary

[0

design and run an experiment in

econoffilCS.

1.2.1 Relevant Areas Open to Experimentation
Economists desiring to enhance their work with the explanatory power of
experiments must identify the research question's relevant area of economics.

Three

areas within economics that lend themselves to experimentation are: market experiments;
game experiments; and individual choice experiments.

Market experiments focus on

market components, market dynamics, and price theory. Game experiments are designed
to examine game theoretic models of behavior. Individual decision-making experiments
seek to improve utility theory. The particular area of economics is generally chosen
based on the questions being asked, the variables the experimenter wants to study, or the
policy intent of the researcher.
Market experiments evolved from the belief that, despite their complex nature,
economic theories of market activity could be tested in a simulated market environment.
An early example of this is Edward Chamberlin's experiment published in 1948. This
experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that markets were not efficient when there
was some contractual obligation preventing suppliers from resening their price.
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Participants were given a card with vaJues from which they could derive their reservation
prices for the buying or selling of some good.

The laboratory for this experiment

consisted of a large room in which participants could move around and freely trade their
hypothetical good. Chamberlin assigned varying amounts to the values and costs of the
good for different participants. Subsequently, the results fonned a supply and demand
curve for the good (and an equilibrium price could be determined). The inability for
participants to renegotiate their contracts resulted in the market not being able to reach
equilibrium. In his report, Chamberlin noted that the experimenter could control the
shape of the supply and demand curves through the choice of the values given to
participants. Chamberlin's experiment showed that a market could be simulated in an
experimental srudy and that an important characteristic of the market could be reproduced
and tested in a laboratory environment.
In his discussion of Chamberlin's experiment, Roth (1995) notes that the design
of the experiment was to show that lags caused by contracts slowed the movement of
prices towards equilibrium.

Chamberlin's experiment was an early indication that

markets were conducive to being tested in the laboratory environment. "Chamberlin's
experiment illustrates the empirical power that comes from being able to create an
environment in which the predictions of a theory can be precisely known.',4
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) address the negotiation aspect of the market economy.
In their experiment, pairs of competitors negotiated over a price and quantity for some
good until an agreement was reached. Each was given a payoff table listing their levels
of profits that varied with the agreed on price and quantity. While Chamberlin broke
ground for the use of experiments in economics. Siegel and Fouraker increased
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awareness about what information is provided to competilOrs during experiments. The
authors went to great lengths to ensure anonymity among participants as well as gain a
better understanding of the roles of infonnation and how the magnitudes of payoffs affect
results (see also Smith, 1962).
Game experiments combine the disciplines of psychology and game theory to test
participants' responses. Experiments test a number of principles including whether or not
participants appear to make decisions based on the assumption of utility or profit
maximization. A prime example of how experimentation has risen with regards to game
theory is the prisoner's dilemma. s
The prisoner's dilemma was initially a psychology problem where two criminals
were captured and separated. The story goes that the district attorney's office does not
have enough evidence to pin murder charges on the criminals, but all the evidence points
to the two in custody. During the ensuing interrogation, each criminal has to decide
between confessing and remaining quiet. Neither knows the decision of their partner
before having to make their own decision. The ramifications can be drawn up into a
four-quadrant game (see Figure 1).

If neither of the criminals confesses, the district

attorney is stuck with lesser charges that carry sentences of five years.

If only one

confesses, the district attorney is in a position to cut that criminal a deal where he only
gets one year in prison and the district attorney will throw the book at the other criminal
resulting in a term of fifty years.

To increase the likelihood of a confession, the

prosecutor promises early parole if they both confess. In that case, each criminal would
serve a sentence of twenty-five years. The best solution for the two criminals is to stay
quiet, as they would each be free in five years time. Game theory provides an alternative
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explanation that the equilibrium solution is

nOl

the preferable result of both defendants

remaining quiet but for both to confess.
Criminal 1
Remain Quiet

Confess

Remain Quiet

Criminal 2
Confess

Figure 1
The following is a discussion of the "best responses" for each criminal. The point
of best response for both players is the Nash Equilibrium,6 the point of best response for
each player thus detennining the outcome. From the first criminal's perspective, if the
second criminal stays quiet, he has a choice between one year for confessing and five
years for remaining quiet. The decision to confess is the optimal choice as one year is
less than five. On the other hand, jf the second criminal confesses, he is in danger of
spending fifty years in prison if he stays quiet, so again his best choice is to confess and
only serve twenty-five. The converse is true from the second criminal's perspective, so
he too will choose to confess. The equilibrium choice (Nash equilibrium, shaded in gray)
is both criminals confessing as it is each criminal's best response. Experimenters can
then test to see what decisions pairs of individuals would make and determine if it
follows the predicted equilibrium. As game experiments evolved, economists saw the
parallel between game experiments and duopoly pricing and oligopolies (see also
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Kalisch, et. al (1954) and Friedman (1969, 1971).

This led to increased interest in

experiments that examine the decision theory as it relates to finns.
Individual decision-making experiments focus on the assumptions regarding the
risk level and the utility functions of consumers. L. L. Thurstone used experimentation to
determine individuals' indifference curves in his 1931 paper.

Thurstone asked

participants to choose between hypothetical bundles consisting of two of the goods (hats,
shoes, and coats) with varying quantities (e.g., four hats, two shoes). This question was
posed with varying numerous quantities to each participant. From the data Thurstone
could explicitly define the preference function for each participant. This experiment was
groundbreaking in that it used experimentation to examine individual choice theory.
Mosteller and Nogee (1951) sought to test expected utility theory. This paper focused on
Ulility theory being derived for the individual with the expectation that the experimentaJ
envirorunenl lent itself to such observations without the confusion of other considerations
muddling the decisions. This experiment highlighted the ability to define the individual's
utility function. The design of the experiment was constructed through the acceptance or
refusal of gambles with varying levels of risk. The gambles also were over real money
(not hypothetical decisions as in the case of Thurstone).
Experimentation concerning individual choice theories generally focuses on
optimization under uncertainty and decision theory, trying to isolate variables that will
reflect the preferences of the participant. The other method for these experiments is to
predetermine the preference function and see how participants react within the
environment. A common application of this is changing the magnitude of the payoffs, as
the possibility exists for monetary restrictions on experiments to not accurately simulate
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real world payoffs (lotteries. for example). It is unlikely that an experimenter would have
sufficient funds where a recipient had the chance to earn a high payout from .a lottery
(e.g., a thousand dollars) merely to make the experiment parallel to the real life situation.
Each of these areas is predisposed to experimentation.

A further example of an

indi vidual choice experiment can be found in the next chapter, where Maurice Allais'
examination of his paradox is outlined. The methodological points laid out in the next
section of the paper are common to all economic experiments.

1.2.2 Methodological Elements for Experimentation
There are a series of key methodological pieces universal to experiments
regardless of the area of economics involved. This section explores the methodological
concepts of experiments including purpose, control, the environment, the laboratory,
motivation of participants, determining preferences, the implications for the foundations
of the experiment, and the interpretation of the results.

These are the pieces of the

methodology pertinent to designing and running experiments that yield noteworthy
results.
The purpose of an experiment is of great importance both to the researcher and to
the economic community.

The experiment must have a purpose consistent with the

earlier definition of economic experiments. The purpose must also include running an
experiment of value that seeks to add what observation of natural occurrences cannot. In
general, experiments have two major purposes: testing the validity of the lynchpin
assumptions on which a theory is based; and testing the limits of the applicability of a
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theory (Smith 1989).

The remammg principles

In

the method outline the necessary

components to observe such behavior.
The second principle of experimentation

IS

that of control.

Control of the

experimental environment separates experimentation from empirical work. All aspects of
the experiments including the decisions of the participants and the information revealed
by the study are directly affected by decisions made by the experimenter.

It is this

control that gives experiments much of their power. Control enables the experimenter to
isolate the variables he or she wishes to study. It also requires that the experimenter
make decisions as to how to represent the underlying assumptions being tested. Control
will also enter into the discussion of where experimenters must exercise caulion. The
concept of control is best illustrated in the discussion of two other parameters of
importance: environment and motivation.
The environment for an experiment is crucial to isolating the desired variables
needed for testing the desired hypotheses. Generally, the environment matches some real
world example (the prisoner's dilemma) and is constructed to place the participants
within the environment so that their actions reflect their behavior as if it were a naturally
occurring situation. An important question the experimenter must address is the question
of whether or not experiments should strive to mimk reality or theory (Friedman and
Sunder 1994).

In the end. the experiment should be designed in a manner that best

reveals useful information to answer the research questions. The environment forms the
foundation of the experiment so that it replicates the assumptions of the model and then
allows participants to maneuver freely. The environment should be designed simply to
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mirror the premises, not force the actions of the panicipants. Some of the effects of
decisions made regarding the environment are visible in the setup of the laboratory.
The laboratory for experimental economics can be as simple as an empty
classroom or as elaborate as a computer facility.

The necessary components of the

laboratory depend on what environment the experimenter is trying to replicate in the
experiment. For the market economy in the earlier Chamberlin example, participants
needed only a large room in which to move about in order to trade freely with other
participants.

For a negotiation experiment, a table and chairs might prove useful to

negotiate across.

Computers are taking on an increasingly imponant role m

experimentation. The world is becoming more and more computer literate, so there is
very little sample selection bias introduced by using them. Computers also allow for a
larger sample size as the cumbersome and time intensive barrier of conducting
experiments by paper is removed.
parameters when using a computer.

It is also easier to control other methodological
Anonymity becomes far easier to maintain as

computers can make opponents or panners completely blind to who is on the other end.
The nature of the laboratory varies with the requirements of the experiment.
The motivation for experiments is often driven through monetary payoffs.
Undergraduate students are attractive candidates for experiments as they have low
marginal costs for their time and will accept lower wages relative to older adults with
stronger commitments.

It is difficult to achieve a representative sample, and college

students offer experimenters flexibility.

Experiments driven mostly by hypothetical

decisions tend to hold less weight and often provide faulty results because they offer
panicipants the ability to think about the problem in the same way they would a math or
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logic problem, not as real life decisions. Their responses are based on their solution to
the problem, not their response to the situation and the consequences of any decision.
The Prisoner's Dilemma will serve as an example of how parties might act under
di fferent situations.

In the event that the question is asked purely hypothetically, the choice between
confessing and not confessing appears to have the obvious decision to remain silent.
That would ensure the possibility of the best outcome because they have a chance at
escaping with only one year of jail time. Furthermore, they are not truly faced with the
consequence, so this decision is not real. When placed in the actual environment of not
knowing what the other prisoner might decide and faced with the real consequence of jail
time, the true Nash equilibrium result of confessing is more likely to appear. The reality
of actual jail time for the participant serves as motivation and is critical for the results of
the experiment to have value. The introduction of monetary payoffs creates a real gain
(or loss) for the participant. In this case, participants might be given money to begin with
and then lose some or all of it depending on the outcome. Motivation is also one way to
influence the next piece of the method, the preference structure for the participant.
Theories are based on the assumptions as to the nature of the preference structure
of human beings (risk aversion, profit maximization, etc.). The preference structure plays
a crucial role in the behavior of a participant in an experiment, and therefore the
treatment of the preference structures requires a significant amount of contemplation by
the experimenter. In general, a theory predicts actions based on a number of assumptions
regarding environment and preferences.

An experimenter has the option of trying to

control the preferences or devising an experiment that reveals them. This choice, as we]]
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as how the preferences are conuolled, directly impacts the outcome of the experiment. In
conjunction with the decisions about preferences, the rules set forth governing the
environment, the structure of the experiment, and the motivation of participants all affect
the abi I i ty for the experiment to fulfill its purpose. Much of the participant's preferences
are controlled in the creation of the environment.?

The theories specify a certain

environment in which they apply and the experiment must suitably replicate it.
The above discussion of important methodological principles reveals the
significance of the construction of an experiment. The decisions made regarding the
environment. the motivation of participants, and the ueatment of preferences all have
ramifications to the results. The choices for each of these components influence the
frame of mind that participants have when they participate in the experiment andlor they
affect the manner in which participants can operate during the experiment. The decisions
made for them about the structure of their environment directly determine if the results
simulate the same questions that the theory addresses. Therefore it is also important to
examine the interpretation of the results based on the criteria chosen by the experimenter.
The results of an experiment bear mentioning because the value and robustness of
the results depend on the decisions made on each of the methodological pOints.

An

economist can devise an experiment that will conclude a specific result but that result will
not necessarily hold weight.

The earlier discussion concerning the characteristics of

experiments of value arises here. If the experiment controls too many parameters or
forces the result in a direction that mirrors the theory, the experiment holds little
explanatory value. It essentially shows one set of circumstances where the theory holds.
However, even this conclusion is tainted by questions regarding the validity of the results
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because some of the assumptions do not allow participants the necessary flexibility (the
experiment is over parameterized). The robustness of any work rests on the extent to
which assumptions are defined realistically. In experimentation, this is especially true.
There are methodological implications for writing experiments that are derived
fTom existing theory.

There is the natural risk that the experimenter will mistakenly

compose an experiment that proves the theory as opposed to testing the foundations of
the theory. When the intended results are already known (the results of the experiment
will be compared with those predicted by the theory), the common course of action is to
design the experiment to reflect the desired results. It is important, however, that the
experimenter mimics the fundamentals of the theory and then allows the actions of the
participants to answer whether or not the theory is founded in the premises. Writing an
experiment that directs the result towards the theoretic prediction does not yield an
experiment of value.
There are several other points that merit noting. An Important truth of economic
experiments is that no one experiment can be used to unequivocally validate a theory.
The restrictions that enable experiments to conlrol the environment also limit the ability
of experiments to yield broad generalizations. The more common scenario is that a series
of experiments or outgrowths of the initial experiment lead to the refinement of the
theory over time.

Vernon Smith, a participant in the earlier Chamberlin experiment,

developed an extension of Chamberlin's experiment (Smith 1962, 1964). The revised
experiment created a "double auction" where all transactions were public knowledge.
Unlike Chamberlin's experiment where long teIlTl contracts locked buyers and sellers in,
buyers were able to auction prices up while sellers were able to auction prices down until
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they met - at the equi Ii bri urn level. Whi Ie the resuhs of Chamberlin's experi ment did not
support existing price theory in that no equilibrium was reached, this improvement on the
experiment showed market convergence.

An important step in making decisions

regarding the details of the experiment is to review related work that might point the
experimenter in a direction.
There

are

drawbacks

to

experimentation

as

well.

Participants,

often

undergraduate students, are less experienced at making decisions and less sophisticated
than markets. An experiment is often oversimplified to isolate the variables and allow
participants to understand the rules of the experiment quickly.

This can lead to

misleading generalizations of the results. Data on some variables are hard to collect in
the natural environment, and chis is not necessarily made easier in the laboratory.
Technical difficulty and the sheer nature of (he variables contribute to making these
variables difficult or impossible to observe. The question of sample selection bias also
can persist as the experimenter might be limited in whom he or she can draw on as a
participant. It is often the problems of oversimplification, obscure variables, and sample
selection bias that draw criticism to experimentation and its legitimacy within the larger
discipline.
Experimenters must consider and understand the benefits and limitations
of experimentation. The previous discussion of the method of experimentation revolves
around the mechanics of conducting the experiments. Unlike the natural environment
where parameters are uncontrollable, the laboratory affords the opportunity for the
experimenter to isolate variables of interest. It is this ability to control parameters and the
environment that makes experimentation a powerful tool.

Also it is this power that
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makes the careful deliberation about methodological decisions important. The ability to
control the environment, structure, preferences, and information in a simulation yield a
tremendous amount of power to the experimenter.

Strong consideration and careful

design are imperative to an experiment's success. Each of the three areas of economics
that lend themselves to experimentation has further methodological considerations unique
to that area.

1.2.3 Applying the Methodology to Fields
There

are

several

discipline-specific

methodological

considerations

that

researchers need to address when designing experiments. The element of environment is
especially important when developing market experiments.

Bargaining and game

theoretic experimenters are faced with the difficult challenge of controlling the
experiment while properly considering the utility curves of participants.

Individual

choice experiments are characterized by their close examination of decision-making,
something that is increasingly complicated and not easily captured in an experiment. The
principle goal of this section is to bring awareness to these issues within the context of
their areas.
A critical characteristic in the definition of experimental econoffilcs

1S

that

experiments test the theoretical assumptions about behavior; they do not test the theory
per se. Experiments that rely heavily on the underlying theoretical conditions for the
environment must be careful not to force participants' actions. Market experiments are
an example of such an experiment that relies on the environment.

The rules and

directions outlined by the experimenter directly define what kind of market the
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participant is operating under (the power of experiments). The mode of compensation
also drives the player's decisions. The design of the experiment should be such that the
environment resembles that of the representative market but still enables the experiment
to examine the underlying principles of the theory.
One of the challenges in running experiments is how to handle the expected utility
curve of participants.

Experimenters have eased around this problem with the

assumption that the expected utility was equal to the compensation from the experiment.
This leads to the assumption that all participants have identical utility curves (Roth 1988).
The problem with this simplification is that when experiments failed, they failed not on
account of the theory but on account of this assumption. As Roth notes, "in order to
provide a test of the theory ... an experiment would have

to

either measure or control for

the expected utility of the bargainers."g In this example, Roth determines that the values
of the payoffs are not important relative to the nature of the payout.

Participants

negotiated over the number of lonery tickets each would receive. The winner of the
lottery would receive some payout YI. The other would receive Y2. If no agreement were
reached, both would receive Y2. Roth varied the magnitudes of the prizes as well as the
extent that bargainers knew these values. He concluded that neither the magnitude nor
the knowledge of the magnitude altered the results. The decisions made regarding the
expected utility functions and whether or not the experiment will test them directly alters
the course of the experiment in so far as it drives the incentives for the participants. As
long as a satisfactory level of motivation is reached so that participants are acting as
agents of the economy, it does not effect the interpretive value of the results.
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Individual choice experiments focus on the choices people make based on
assumptions of risk and rationality.

Models based on this assumed rationality are

curtailed by experiments that test the underlying fundamentals of the assumptions. As
economic models get increasingly complex, the reliance on these often-incorrect
assumptions impacts the effectiveness of the theory. Studying these errors is important,
as Cohn Camerer (1995) notes, because the frequency and magnitude of the errors in
judgment affect economic outcomes and efficiency.

A key methodological difference

between psychology and experimental economics is deception. Psychology often induces
erroneous decisions through trickery and deception. Economic experiments are valuable
because the results express natural violations of the assumptions in a laboratory
environment, they do not induce violations through tricking the participants. Allowing
participants to operate naturally is required in experiments of value; it is far more
valuable

(0

show an irrational response or decision in a narural environment then to have

designed an experiment to force the irrationality.
Thjs section focused on three areas of the methodology that deserve considerable
attention by experimenters. The decisions regarding the environment and the preference
functions of participants directly weigh on the results.

The components of the

methodology discussed throughout this chapter are critical to creating experimentS of
value regardless of the area of economics from which the research question is derived. In
each area, however, there are special aspects of the methodology that require a
considerable amount of thought so that the experiment holds value.
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CHAPTER 2

Allais Paradox: An Experimental View

I1ze ALIais Paradox is perhaps the most widely ciled piece of
evidence on decision making under uncenainty. 1101 because iT is a
large piece of evidence, but raTher because it is a contrary piece of
evidence.
- John Conlisk
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The best way to illustrate the methodological principles of experimental
economics discussed in the first chapter is through an example. The Allais Paradox was
one of the first fannal experiments designed to test the underlying assumptions of
decision theory. This chapter will explore the Allais Paradox and what questions it raised
regarding decision theory. The goal of the chapler is to demonstrate the principles from
the previous chapter on designing and interpreting experiments before commencing with
a larger experiment.

2.1 Allais Paradox
In two papers given

In

1953, Maurice Allais outlined his paradox challenging

existing decision theory that is based on expected utility theory.

Decision theory

specifies that there must be consistency between choices regarding risk preferences. In a
choice between two items, if one is preferred to the other it must always be preferred.
The level of utility attached to each choice determines the preference structure for the
player. Allais found that when given the choice between two sets of loneries, peoples'
responses were inconsistent with those predicted by decision theory. These decisions
implied that participants based their choices on eIToneous valuations of expected utility
for each option.
Assumptions regarding the nature of the utility function are not required. While
traditionally it is assumed that the utility function for participants is upward sloping and
exhibits diminishing marginal returns, this only serves to provide one case where the
paradox might work. In this case, different levels of utility might be preferred based on
risk preference, and allowing participants to determine their own preference structure
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outside the model does not change the results of the Allais Paradox. The Allais Paradox
refers to an inconsistency in preferences that a series of decisions reflects. By simply
denoting the difference of relative values of utility between choices, the paradoxical
conflict in decisions made by participants becomes clear. One assumption regarding the
value of a utile is necessary. The utility of $0 is zero. Four lotteries l will serve as an
example for examining the AJIais Paradox in detail.
The first choice is between loneries A and B:
Lottery A:
Payoff of $100 with certainty (a probability of 1.00)
Lottery B:
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.01
Payoff of $100 with a probability of 0.89
Payoff of $500 with a probability of 0.10
The second choice is between lotteries C and D:
Lottery C:
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.89
Payoff of $100 with a probability of 0.11
Lottery D:
Payoff of $500 with a probability of 0.10
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.90
According to utility theory, participants should attach a value of utility for each of the
possible choices, A, B, C, and D. Participants then choose between the first two lotteries.
This choice determines the relative value of the expected utility for lotteries A and B. If
A is chosen over B, then the expected utility level for A is preferred to that of B.
Likewise, jf lottery B is chosen over lottery A, the expected utility for B is preferred to
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that of A.

Decision theory then says that subsequent choices are made based on the first

decision - if one level of utility is preferred in one instance, that same level of utility
must be preferred in all other instances.
Allais noticed that there was an inconsistency with peoples' choices. In a similar
replication of Allais' experiment, Christoph Hauert 2 showed responses A and D were the
overwhelming pair of choices made by participants. Choosing lotteries A and D violates
the premise of decision theory that there is consistency between choices. The following
illustrates that if lottery A is preferred

(Q

lottery B, then lottery C should be preferred to

lottery D. If lottery A is preferred to lottery B, the expected utility for the decision is
shown to be:
u(A) > u(B):

l.00u($I00) > 0.lOu($500) + 0.89u($100) + O.Olu($O)
0.11 u($1 00) > 0.lOu($500)

(2.1)

And if lottery D is preferred to lottery C:
u(D) > u(C):

0.lOu($500) + 0.90u($0) > 0.11 u($100) + 0.11 u($O)
0.lOu($500) > 0.11 u($100)

(2.2)

The expected utility of choosing lottery C over lottery D is calculated to be
u(C) > u(D):

0.11u($100) + 0.89u($0) > 0.10u($500) + 0.90u($0)
0.l1u($100) > 0.lOu($500)

(2.3)

This is equivalent to choosing lottery A over B [u(A) - u(B) above]. Similarly, when
lottery B is chosen over lottery A, the level of expected utility is
u(B) > u(A):

0.89u($loo) + 0.10u($500) + 0.01u($0) > 1.00u($100)
0.lOu($500) > O.llu($lOO)

(2.4)

The value of expected utility for each choice is now known. It is clear that choices A and
C yield the same level of utility while choices Band D yield another. The paradox lies in
that the second choice by participants, given the choice of A in the first set of lotteries.
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goes against the theoretical prediction that C be chosen.

As shown above, choosing

lonery A yields a different expected utility than choosing lottery D. Given that loueries
A and C provide the same level of utility and loneries B and D have equivalent levels of
utility, if A is preferred to B, then C should be preferred to D. The expected utility of
choosing lottery Cover lonery D is calculated to be O.llu($lOO) > O.lOu($500) (equation
2.3). This is equivalent to choosing lottery A over B (equation 2.1). Similarly, when
lottery B is chosen over lottery A, the level of expected utility is O.10u($500) >
0.11 u($lOO) (equation 2.4). This result is equivalent to choosing lottery Dover C [u(D)

> u(C) above]. If for the initial decision lottery A is chosen, then lottery C should be
chosen during the second choice. Since lotteries A and C have equivalent levels of utility
and loneries B and D also have equivalent levels of utility, if one level (A) was chosen
over another (B) in one instance, it (C) should be chosen over the other (D) in all
instances in order for rank ordering of preferences to be consistent. A participant who
chooses lotteries A and D or loneries Band C violates decision theory because they have
shown conflicting preferences towards the same level of utility. This is the violation that
Allais observed which led him to question the premises of decision theory.

2.2 Testing Allais Paradox
An experiment replicating the Allais Paradox (outlined above) was run to
illustrate the methodological points from the previous chapter. In order to test the Allais
Paradox, participants were presented with a choice between loneries A and Band
lotteries C and D (Appendix 2.2 contains a copy of the experiment). Participants were
asked to answer the questions without help, being sure to read each lottery carefully.
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Along with their choice, they were also asked to provide a brief explanation as to why
they chose each lonery.
Asking the participant to explain their decision serves to motivate the participant
to find a logical response. Their decision then holds some credibility as a real world
decision. The validity of the results is somewhat diminished by the lack of a monetary
payoff in this small experimenL The incentive for participants to try existed because the
students were asked to partiCipate by their microeconomic theory professor, so they may
have felt compelled to try. The consequence of the choices made by the experimenter
will be discussed later in this section.

The substance of the process makes this

experiment an illustrative example of the properties of experimentation.

A complete

description of the experiment's procedures is in Appendix 2.1.

2.2.1 Data
The participants in the experiment were microeconomic theory students at Colby
College. Colby is a small, liberal arts college with a population of approximately 1800
students and is located in Waterville, Maine. Students taking the microeconomic theory
course are generally majors or minors in their third semester of economic education.
There were a total of fony-five participants for this study, fifteen female, thirty male.
The population of the 'school has slightly more females than males, so females were
underrepresented in the study relative to the student body population. All respondents
were asked to provide some explanation as to what led to each of their decisions. There
was no time limit imposed on participants so they could carefully think through each
possible choice.

The experiments were numbered for convenience but taken
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anonymously. The experiment was conducted during the lab section of the course, so no
time sacrifice was made on the part of any of the participants.

2.2.2 Results
Graph 1 shows a bar graph of the four possible combinations of choices of
lotteries (AC, AD, Be, and BD). As shown in the graph, 31 participants chose lotteries B
and D, 12 participants chose lotteries A and D, and 2 chose lotteries A and C.

No

participants chose lotteries B and C.
Distribution of Pairs of Answers
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Graph 1: Possible Combinations of Pairs of Lotteries

2.2.3 Analysis
As shown earlier, only two of the possible fOUf pairs of choices are consistent
with decision theory: AC and BD. Twelve of the participants chose the combination AD.
These twelve observations represent twenty-seven percent of the total number of
responses.

While the majority of respondents chose a combination consistent with
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decision theory, those that chose incorrectly aptly show what Allais saw - that decision
theory based solely on utility maximization fails to cover many cases. Those who chose
lotteries A and C or lotteries B and D offered explanations consistent with decision
theory as to why they chose each lottery. Most revolved around risk seeking (B and D)
or risk aversion (A and C) attitudes relating to the probability of each outcome. There
were a high number of risk-seeking responses.

One participant who chose B and D

wrote, "You have about the same probability of winning money but you receive $400
more [in the second case]."
Participants who choose lotteries A and D aJso provided explanations, but their
logic fails to hold. One participant wrote for the decision between lotteries A and B that
'The probabilities given for lottery B are too low - the probability of 0.89 is high enough
so I would think I would get $89 for B. But the 0.10 probability of the $500 payoff is too
low. The probability of 1.00 for lottery A seems like the best choice." In essence, the
person has stated that taking a one percent risk of nothing for the opportunity to get $500
with a probability of ten percent is not worth the risk. However, in the second choice
between lotteries C and D the same participant writes, "Although the probability of
getting $100 in lonery C is higher (0.11 compared

to

0.10), the amount that you would

get in lottery D is still significantly higher." This logic contradicts the logic for choosing
lonery A over B in the first pair as again the difference is only one percent.

Allais

proposed the concept of fanning out indifference curves to explain this phenomenon. As
indifference curves shift outward with changing probabilities and payoffs. decisions are
altered. Older decision theory required that indifference curves shift in a paraJlel fashion,
thus the decisions should not change. The Allais Paradox holds true when a participant's
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indifference curves do not shift parallel but fan out as Allais proposes when the payoffs
and probabilities change from lottery to lottery. The comments by participants in this
study serve to verify that some possess utility functions of the form Allais described,
even if it is due in part to faulty logic.

2.3 The Methodology of Experiments in Practice
The Allais Paradox experiment exemplifies many of (he methodological steps
outlined in the first chapter. The first point discussed in Section 2.1 regards the purpose
of the experiment. The purpose of the experiment was to serve as a practical example of
an experiment that would possess many of the critical components of the methodology.
The experiment maintains the goal of holding the properties of experiments of value.
The oveniding goal was illustrative. not economic, but the experiment was devised in a
manner as if the economic content was the primary purpose.

Unlike the experiment

presented in Chapter 3. the intent of the Allais experiment was to test the conditions that
establish the groundwork for decision theory in a way that would help iJJustrate many of
the methodological points.
One component from the methodology that was altered is motivation.

The

motivation for the experiment is driven completely by non-monetary means. Participants
were not compensated for their responses, much less rewarded for the decisions that they
made. It is possible that a lack of compensation has the ability to alter how a person acts
in an experiment (the hypothetical decision does not always reflect a similar decision to
the one made when the decision is real). However, having participants write down their
explanation forces them to reflect on why they made their decision. PartiCipants were
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expected to be there and participate by their professor. This served as two fonns of
motivation.

By not compensating the participants, the underlying rational may have

changed. When faced with the possibility of real payoffs, more participants may have
been risk averse (choosing loneries A and C) compared to the large number of responses
that were risk taking (chose lotteries B and D). Not compensating the participants effects
the economic substance of the results of the experiment as it pertains to risk preferences,
not the ability for the study to reflect Allais hypothesis or clarify the methodological
points.

Neither the illustrative purpose nor the lack of incentive-based motivation

impedes the experiment from investigating the Allais Paradox or reflecting the
methodological points discussed in the first chapter.
The environment of the experiment reflects the goals of the environment an
experimentalist would establish in the laboratory. Students were gi yen the experiment
that laid out the different options for lotteries. They were then asked to choose which
lonery they would prefer in each instance. The infonnation provided to participants
established the set of guidelines under which they could act (e.g., they could not consult
with one another while making their choices). The established parameters ensure that the
decisions made are based on the participant's own rationale. This is critical to testing the
assumptions about decision theory. The ability to create an environment where the set of
parameters mirror the assumptions is critical to conducting experiments of value.
The point concerning the control of the experiment exhibited by the experimenter
is also shown in the Allais example. The control of the experiment is shown through the
determination of the payoffs, the probabilities of each payoff, the order of the loneries,
and the previously discussed decisions about compensation and asking participants to
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provide explanations for their choices. The magnitude of the payoffs impacts what the
participant is thinking. For some people, the difference between payoffs of a few dollars
is negligible while the difference between one and five million dollars might no longer be
worth the risk (had the first choice been a million dollars with certainty, for example).
The choice to set the magnitudes at zero, one hundred, and five hundred dollars
respectively exhibits a middle area where people will alter their risk preferences because
the difference is distinct. Others, including AlJais and Hauert, chose higher magnitudes
(millions of francs, thousands of Euros) that are not realistic decisions faced by a college
student. Altering the payouts to a lower nominal value maintains a level of realism in
that people are faced with making decisions involving a few hundred dollars more often
than they might with several thousands or millions dollars.
The probabilities for each of the payoffs also demonstrate the control of the
experimenter. Allais' decisions regarding the odds were designed to illustrate that there
are differences in the level of expected utility even though the relative probabilities are
close. The existence of close probabilities required that participants think through the
scenario and carefully calculate their expected levels of utility for each option, a step
necessary to achieving quality results. The order of the lotteries is also important. By
placing the pair of lotteries containing the choice with a probability of one as the first set,
the experimenter immediately detennines the relative risk preference of the individual, as
the probability of a certain event is less risky than an event with any risk. The decisions
regarding the purpose of the experiment and compensation were made with the
knowledge that the experiment was for illustrative purposes only. Part of the decision is

33
also forced by circumstances, such as a budget constraint, that prevented the
experimenter from offering compensation.

In the analysis of the experiment, it was shown that the majority of respondents
made choices consistent with decision theory. The economic content of these results is
determined based on the points raised regarding the methodological legitimacy of the
experiment. First, the experiment does not confinn the assumptions of either decision
theory or the Allais Paradox regarding decision theory. The number of respondents that
made choices consistent with Allais' conjectures is numerous enough to conclude that
there are some questions regarding the completeness of the assumptions for decision
theory.

The fact that twenty-seven percent of participants failed to act in a manner

consistent with decision theory should bring economists some pause. While the design of
the experiment did not encompass monetary incentives, there is sufficient ability to draw
definitive conclusions from the results regarding the underlying assumptions of decision
theory.
The Allais experiment serves as an example of the various components of the
methodology for experimental economics described in the first chapter. The pieces of the
methodology inconsistent with those specified offer the reader insight into the violations
that can affect the effectiveness of an experiment and its results. The Allais experiment
provides information regarding the inconsistent nature of decision theory as well as
insight into the methodology and how it relates to running experiments. The careful
consideration of each methodological component is critical to running experiments of
value.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
2.1 Procedures for Allais Experiment
2.2 AUais Experiment

2.1: Procedures for Allais Experiment

Procedure For Classroom Experiment: AJlais Paradox
Brief introduction of the project:
J

am doing a Senior Scholar project focusing on experimental economics.

This small classroom experiment is being used to act as an example of the
methodologies of experimental economics.

Introduction of experiment:
This experiment is a reproduction of a classic experiment.

Your responses to

this experiment are all anonymous. The experiment involves choosing between
lotteries.

Please be sure to read all options carefully and answer them

thoughtfully, including a brief description of why you made your choices. Please
fill this out on your own. If you have any questions, I can take them now.

Thank you. When you are finished, turn your sheet over on your desk. Wait
quietly until everyone is finished. I will now pass out the sheets.

Has everyone completed the experiment?

Please pass the sheets to the person on the aisle. I will come down and collect
them now. Thank you for participating.
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2.2: Allais Experiment
Gender: Male 0

Female 0

Major(s):

Minor(s):

Below are four lotteries. Pick one lottery from each group. Pick either A or B.
Then pick either C or D. Be sure to read each of the lotteries carefUlly. Please
complete this exercise alone with out the consultation of your peers. Write the
letter of each of your choices in the space provided. Please also provide a brief
explanation of your choices.

Lottery Group 1:
Lottery A:
Payoff of $100 with certainty (a probability of 1.00)
Lottery B:
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.01
Payoff of $100 with a probability of 0.89
Payoff of $500 with a probability of 0.10
Your Choice:

_

Why?

Lottery Group 2:
Lottery C:
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.89
Payoff of $100 with a probability of 0.11
Lottery D:
Payoff of $500 with a probability of 0.10
Payoff of $0 with a probability of 0.90
Your Choice:
Why?

_
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Notes
I

Similar to Allais (a, b); a variation on Kagel (1995), p. 8; also see Hauert (a)

2

Hauert (a)

CHAPTER 3

Experimental Economics Tackles the Gas Station Duopoly Problem

"Economic theories always deal with certain alleged behavioral
tendencies in isolation, (and] the experimental laboratory is uniquely
well suited for testing the validity of such theories."
- Vernon L. Smith
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Much of the first two chapters were spent defining experimental economics and
outlining the manner in which economists can use it to aid in their research. The best
way to illustrate the power of experimentation is with an original experiment.

The

previous chapter took an experiment devised by another economist that examjned
underlying assumptions of decision theory brought into question by the Allais Paradox.
This experiment served as an example of one of the experimental methods outlined in the
first chapter. The process of devising and running an experiment without the benefit of it
previously being run offers the unique opportunity to examine in detail experimentation
as it pertains to economics.

This chapter will present a revision to the underlying

assumptions of duopoly, the new model of duopoly that results from these revisions, and
an experiment to test whether these changes are valid.

3.1 Duopoly and Experimentation
The exploration of duopoly lends itself to experimentation due to two of the
previously

defined

principles

of experimentation:

control

and transparency

of

participants' decisions. Empirical evidence on pricing decisions is difficult to collect, as
the rationale used by competitors in how they detennine their price is the optimal data,
and this is not information that businesses willingly provide.

The experimental

environment can duplicate the market conditions faced by firms while seeking
explanations as to why certain decisions were made. Furthermore, the experimenter can
control the underlying foundations of the experimental market and then draw conclusions
about the market tendencies from the players' actions.
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Players in market games do not have the same motivations as actual business
owners, but careful construction of the reward structure can create a similar desire to
maximize profit. Simulating the incentives that the finns face when creating the payoff
structure for players puts the players in a similar position as the owners. This enables the
players' actions to be guided by a set of restrictions (assumptions from the theory). This
makes the players' actions similar to a duopolist's, only now a player's actions can be
observed and recorded. The purpose of the motivation is to force players into the same
set of circumstances as market participants. The experimenter outlines the assumptions
for the market and thus constrains the players to be in the position of a duopolist. The
transparency of the participants' decisions offers the experimenter the ability to collect
the necessary data to determine if the market actions of the participants reflect those
eltpected by theory.
Oligopoly, the economic concept of which duopoly is a subtopic, lends itself to
ex.perimentation. James Friedman (1971) and Hoggatt, Friedman, and Gill (1976) review
oligopoly experiments including duopoly markets.
experimental results on a duopoly market.

Claudia Keser (1993) presents

While each author presents theories and

models that differ from the one tested here, each of the experiments aim for the same
market dynamics.

Friedman discusses at length an oligopoly equilibrium structured

around noncooperative oligopolies. Hoggatt, Friedman, and GiJI design an experiment
around a basic model of oligopoly and are interested in observed behavior. Their paper
focused on price signaling and the extent to which price changes can be predicted by such
signaling. These papers are examples of how experimentation is a natural instrument for
extending the theories of oligopoly markets.
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Keser's model, like the one presented in this paper, establishes the pricing
decision as the only experimental variable. Restricting player (or finn) decisions to the
determination of price allows for the examination of how modifying the assumptions of
consumer behavior affect the pricing decision. The dynamic in duopolies has long been
characterized by consumer behavior dictating firm behavior. Keser's paper is an example
of using the price variable as the gauge to measure how accurately the experimental
results are in line with theoretical predictions. The body of literature in experimental
economics that focuses on market activity, specifically within oligopoly, reinforces the
validity for the use of experimentation as a method for examining duopoly theory.

3.2 Review of Duopoly Theory
Discussions of and revisions to duopoly theory are prevalent throughout economic
literature.

Much of this is due to the inability of one set of simple assumptions to

accurately reflect the real-world decisions made by competing firms. The result is that
numerous economists present alternative models to fine tune duopoly theory.

This

section wi II focus on the roots of duopoly theory as well as several revisions. Much of
the following discussion of the theories of Coumot and Benrand comes from the
textbook by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001). The revisions to duopoly theory of Kahn
(1937) and Simon, Puig, and Aschoff (1973) are examined as each introduces important
fundamentaJs of the model proposed in this paper.
Augustin Coumot developed the initiaJ duopoly theory in 1838. He hypothesized
that each firm must make a production decision based on market conditions and their
expectation of their opponent's production level.

There are several imporrant
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assumptions for the model. First, the market price is determined by the total output of the
competing firms. The sum of the quantities produced by each finn determines the market
quantity and thus the price. Second, each finn detennines output based in part on their
opponent's production decisions and assumes that their opponent's output in the current
period will be the same as in the previous period. The third assumption is that the goods
are homogenous and consumers are indifferent between homogenous goods. The finaJ
assumption is that the firms make their production decisions simultaneously.
It is the second assumption that provides the basis for the dynamics of the model.
Output is determined based on the expectation of an opponent's decision, and each firm
reacts to the expected decision of their opponent. Coumot develops a reaction function to
assess how each firm will alter their output decision given various production levels of
their opponent.

The reaction function determines the profit maximizing level of

production in the current period for each finn given their opponent's level of output from
the previous period. The totaJ revenue function is modified to incorporate the level of
output for both finns (the sum of which determines market price). From this new total
revenue function, the marginal revenue function is derived and set equaJ to marginal cost.
This result, solved for the quantity of the first firm, forms the reaction function.
Inspection of the reaction function shows that the two firms will choose the level of
production where the two reactions functions intersect. This is defined as the Coumot
equilibrium.
The dynamics of the model occur when the two finns are away from the
equilibrium point. Because of the assumption that the opponent will remain fixed at the
level of output from the previous period, each firm reacts to the previous period's level of
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output. If Firm Two is initially below the equilibrium level of production while Finn
One is above the equilibrium level, Finn One will react by decreasing output while Finn
Two will react by increasing output. The end result is that over time Firm One will
decrease output while Firm Two will increase output until the two firms reach the
equilibrium level of output (Coumot). Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics if the two firms
start out at such a point (denoted A). Firm One reacts by lowering its output while Firm
Two reacts by increasing its output (indicated by the arrows in the diagram). The two
firms end up at production point B during the second round. The third round would again
show both firms altering output and thus moving towards the Coumol equilibrium as the
rounds progress.

Finn 2's R.uction Curve

Finn l's Reaction Cutve

Figure 3.1
Coumot also provides a mechanism for finding the point where the two firms
would be best off if they worked together, the collusive equilibrium. It is at this point
where each firm is maximizing potential profits,

This point is generally below the

Coumot equilibrium (a lower level of output).

The collusion curve is found by

calculating the different levels of quantity that maximize profits. Figure 3.2 diagrams the
equilibrium quantity solutions of firms: collusion, Cournot, and strict competition.
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..•.............. ~ Competitive

Figure 3.2
COUrTIot predicted that the two firms would produce where the two reaction curves were
equal, but this point is not necessarily when the quantity is evenly distributed between the
two firms. If the two firms each face different demand curves (the sum of which is the
market demand curve), each finn has a different total revenue function and hence
different marginal revenue functions and reaction functions. The equilibrium point does
not necessarily occur when the market quantity is split evenly ben.veen the two firms.
In 1883, Joseph Bertrand argued that competition does nOl occur based on
quantities, but on price. In his revision to Coumor, Bertrand relied on many of the same
assumptions as COUrTIot but applied them to price competition. Bertrand assumes that the
goods are homogenous. The assumption regarding stagnant quantities has been modified
to stagnant prices - the price for the competitor for the current period is expected to be
the same as price for the last period. Both firms make pricing decisions simultaneously.
The final assumption is that the lower price determines the market price (and quantity)
and that the firm with the lower price receives all of the business for that period. This
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last assumption stems from the property of demand functions that any consumer can buy
the product as long as they are willing to pay the market price.
The result from Bertrand's model is that the price chosen by each competitor is
equal to the marginal cost of the product. The products are homogenous and consumers
are indifferent between the two, thus the finn with the lower price will receive all of the
business. At any price above marginal cost there is an incentive to undercut the current
market price. As a result, finns will choose marginal cost as their price - they make no
economic profit but both receive business.
The collusive equilibrium exists in Bertrand duopoly as well. The price at which
both competitOrs share the maximum sustainable profit for the market is the collusive
price. This price occurs at the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The
result of both finns choosing this price is that they. split the market quantity and the
profits. This is an unstable equilibrium as there is an incentive to undercut this price in
order to receive all of the business, and as a result realize a higher level of profits. The
assumption that the competitor will not change his or her price leads players to believe
that undercutting will increase their profits. Subsequently, they each undercut and price
begins to fall towards marginal cost. Coumot and Bertrand present the foundations for
duopoly theory. One of the common criticisms of the theories is that they assume away
too much and therefore lose applicability. In order to more aptly describe duopolists'
actions, a discussion of other economists' criticisms and subsequent revisions of these
theories is necessary for the development of a better model.
R. F. Kahn published an article entitled the "Problem of Duopoly" in 1937. In
this article. he points out the erroneous supposition of Coumot and Bertrand that the
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firms employ the tactic of determining quantity or price for the next period based on the
expectation that their competition will leave their quantity or price level unchanged. The
second part of the supposition states that the opposing finn makes the exact same
assumption about the first firm's decisions. The illogical nature of the assumption that
both firms believe that its opponent will not alter its price if the first finn alters its price is
self-evident and thus the supposition is in need of revision. A better set of assumptions
that clarifies the reactions by firms to changes in output or in price by a competitor is
ultimately the direction of the development of duopoly theory.
The case of duopoly is especially difficult for this reason - any model put forth
can claim some validity because the set of assumptions adopted by finns is as varied and
complex as the economic theories that describe them.

The decisions made by finns

cannot easily be simplified into any simple set of assumptions, and therefore any theory
aiming to map duopoly theory must take into account the varied nature of finn

action~.

Kahn postulates that "the assumptions which [the firm] makes [about an opponent's
behavior] are correct, being based either on supreme intelligence or on the employment
of the method of trial and error."] That is, if Firm A reduces price (increases output),
whatever response Firm B makes is the correct one. The imponance of Kahn's article in
the context of this paper is that he brings to light two facts: the existing assumptions
regarding consumer and firm behavior presented by both Cournot and Bertrand are
inherently unsound, and the nature of these reaction functions are flawed and must also
be revised.
Kahn chooses to revise the reaction functions based on his assumption that firm
behavior is always correct. Coumot and Bertrand assume that a change in quantity or

45
price by one firm will be "unexpected" and that no learning will occur by finns. Kahn
determines that each firm has some automatic response to changes made by opponents
based on their opponent's reactions in prior periods. A firm learns about their opponent
and thus determines the best automatic response to an opponent's actions. The exact
nature of this response is left unanswered by Kahn, as he notes that there is no way of
determining the result of if Firm A increases output by Ax, then Firm B responds by
increasing or decreasing output by tly.2 Specifically, there is no economic meaning

to

the magnitude of 6y without an understanding of how firms learn and thus create their
"automatic" reaction function.

The conclusion drawn by the author is that the

relationship between firms will evolve into a price leader and price follower siruation
where Firm B wilt always react immediately to changes made by Finn A. and vice versa.
While Kahn recognizes that such a model is not easily realized, game theory provides the
ability to postulate how firms might make such decisions.
Simon, Puig, and Aschoff (1973) run a series of simulations that examine the
decision process of firms, as well as the distribution of market quantiry between the
firms. These two ideas are encompassed in the model presented in Section 3.3. While
the authors concerned themselves largely with the pattern of decisions made by firms.
their underlying characterizations of how firms make pricing decisions is of interest.
Bertrand believes that the expected price level of each competitor is equal to that of the
previous period. Kahn anticipates some unidentified level of learning to occur. Simon,
Puig, and Aschoff claim that each firm forms an expectation for its opponent's price for
the next period based on a function of prices from the previous period and a probability
for how its opponents will react to price changes.

Firms also consider the market
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ramifications of their decision, as changing prices could alter market output. The final
consideration the authors make is to discount future periods' revenues.
The second important modification the authors make is to the distribution of the
market quantity between the finns. In their model, the distribution is based on a lagged
tenn determined by the firm's previous period's quantities (a brand loyalty effect) as well
as the current difference in price.

If a firm is the lower priced finn in consecutive

periods. the change in the percentage of market quantity received by that firm increases at
an increasing rate (the lower priced firm over time will gain customer recognition as the
cheaper alternati ve).
Both of these considerations alter the assumptions of Bertrand. The consideration
of how an opponent might set its price is an important variation as it is far more realistic:
no firm can reasonably expect that its competitor will do nothing as a response to a
change in the competitor's price. Allowing the higher priced finn to receive business is
also a realistic modification. The idea that firms weigh their expectations on what their
opponent might do based on previous actions, is incorporated into the model presented in
Section 3.3. The second consideration will be modified further, altering how the market
quantity is distributed but maintaining that the lower priced finn does not receive the
entire market quantity.
A final element introduced with the inclusion of game theory is that of collusion.
While certain parameters in the model expressly do not allow for communication or
collusion, the nature of infinitely repeated games makes collusion possible.

A more

detailed explanation of this occurs in the next section, which outlines the revised
assumptions that form a new model for duopoly.
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3.3 Towards a New Theory of Duopoly
There is a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence that one of the underlying
assumptions of duopoly theory does not hold.

Bertrand supposes that in a duopoly

situation, the two firms would compete on price and the lower priced firm would receive
all of the business.

However, as you drive down almost any street in the country,

gasoline stations with varying prices can be found, even those located directly across
from, or next to, one another.

This contradicts Bertrand's equilibrium prediction.

Furthermore, there is almost always business at both firms, violating the underlying
assumption that the lower price prevails in a market for a homogenous good.
Many explanations can be devised for why Bertrand's predictions do nOt reflect
reality. The overall product, the gas station's services, is not a homogenous bundle of
goods. For example, Mobile has a SpeedPass feature that enables customers to quickly
pay for their gas by waving a wand already connected to a credit card in front of the
pump. Bob's Gas and Oil does not have this feature. If Mobil is more expensive, it
might be worth it to a consumer to pay the extra pennies for this convenience, even
though the gas offered at both stations is exactly the same. Existing theory does not
account for this disparity. Gasoline is a homogenous good, so there must be some way to
account for the inconsistency in outcomes through modifying the assumptions.
There are two variations to the underlying assumptions of price theory. The first
variation is that there is an opportunity cost to going across the street to the other station.
Perhaps there is a median across the road or it is a busy highway. The consumer views
this as an added opportunity cost to the gasoline on the other side of the

stree~

effecti vely

increasing the price of gas for the station across the street. The price at the pump might
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even be cheaper at the station across the street, but if the opportunity cost is high enough,
the real cost to the consumer might be higher at the station across the street (with the
lower price at the pump). The second variation is that consumers obtain a higher level of
utility by using one station over another. This might occur because one station has a
good or service that the consumer wishes to have access to (car wash, credit card
friendly, Mobil SpeedPass, etc.). Consumers choose which gas station to buy from based
on the utility received from each bundle of goods (shape of the indifference curve) when
compared to the price of gas at each station (the budget constraint).

Each of these

manipulations can be seen as an alteration in the budget constraint for a consumer or the
definition of the indifference curve for a consumer.
The following example will illustrate a consumer's decision. If two gas stations
are located across the street from one another, a consumer must make a choice between
gas Station A on the same side of the road and gas Station B on the other side. The
consumer anaches a convenience premium to gas Station B because it has the added
convenience of a car wash.

This modifies the shape of the indifference curve from

indifferent between the two stations (straight line) to favoring the firm with the
conveniences (B). Having to cross the road to get to Station B represents an opportunity
cost to the consumer. This is seen in the form of an increase in the price of the gas for
Station B.
Figure 3.3 shows the budget constraint line and indifference curve if a consumer
is truly indifferent between stations A and B. Figure 3.4 shows the above example of a
preference for Station B (indifference curve that is convex to the origin) with a change in
slope of the budget constraint due to Station B's location (opportunity cost, effective P B
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This example is for one consumer and identifies why a consumer would pay a higher
price for the same gas, an important component of (he revised model.
Turning from the individual consumer to the market, the overaJl market is the sum
of each consumer's preference function.

The market will operate in a manner that

rewards the firm with the lower price. As the difference in price between the two firms
increases, the value of the convenience becomes outweighed by the greater difference in
price. The result of this is that fewer consumers are willing to pay the higher price to go
to the other station. If both prices are the same at the pump, the market allows for a
difference in price to accommodate the opportunity cost and convenience premium that
distinguish stations, allowing the station with (he higher effective price to have some
business, a different outcome from Bertrand. The next piece addresses the nature of this
relationship.
The market is set (total quantity) by the firm with the lower price as any consumer
can purchase gas at that price or higher. The elements of the linear demand function are
the market price (P), the market quantity (Q), the maximum price at which consumers are
willing [0 purchase gas (PMAX), and the rate (slope) at which quantity demanded
decreases with an increase in price (M).

A linear demand function was chosen to

simplify the expreSSions, but the theory is not constrained by this assumption.
demand function is defined as
P=PMAX-M'Q

or

The
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The price for the higher priced firm is defined as PH and the price for the lower priced
finn is defined as P L , so the market quantity is redefined as

3.1

The market quantity is then divided between the two firms to favor the firm with the
lower price. As the difference between the two prices (PH -

Pd increases, the firm with

the higher price loses business at an exponential rate. This is an added assumption to the
model to account for the actions of consumers. A slight difference in prices does not
force {he higher priced firm out of the market.

In terms of the utility function

explanation, there are consumers in the market with strong enough preferences for one
station (A) over the other (B) so that even if the price of A is greater than the price of B,
[hey will still choose Station A. They are willing to pay a premium to have access to the
services offered by Station A.

As the price gap increases, the number of consumers

priced out of the convenience premium increases at an exponential rate. The quantity of
consumers priced out of the market is denoted D. Subsequently, the quantity for the firm
with the lower price increases and the quantity for the higher priced firm decreases by
this amount (D). If PH> PL , the quantity of each firm (H: higher, L: lower) is

QH =Y2Q M- D

3.2

and

3.3
D is defined to be an exponential difference function of the form

10. 2100PH -lOOPl-l

3.4
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It is exponential in form because as the price gap grows, consumers are priced out of their
willingness to pay for access to conveniences at an exponential rate. If the prices are the
same the difference is zero (if PH
difference in prices

(PH

=P

L,

the function is set equal to zero, not five). The

-P L ) is multiplied by 100 in order to normalize the difference in

prices to an integer. This particular fonn was derived because it best simulated the
realistic assumption that as the price gap increased, consumers would get priced out at an
exponential rate. It also eliminated the higher priced firm when their price was more than
five cents above their competitor's price. It is assumed that no consumer is willing to pay
more than fi ve cents for axis to the conveniences at one station.
The quantity for each firm can now be defined as

and

The higher quantity (QH) is bound by the maximum of the function (112 QM) and zero; the
lower quantity (QL) is bound by the market maximum (QM) and one-half of the market
quantity (Y2 QM). If the two prices are equal

(PH

= P L), QH = QL (the maximum

for QH

and the minimum for Qd. Each firm has a set of conveniences for half of the market
over time (in the morning rush hour, Finn A sells coffee; during evening rush hour, Firm
B sells soda).

The exponential difference function allows for each firm to receive

business as long as their prices are reasonably close to each other.

Once the price

difference becomes too great, consumers are priced out of their convenience premium
and only the firm with the lower price receives business.
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Graph I illustrates the effect of the convenience premium on the demand curve
for the entire market. If Firm A chooses its price, then Finn B can map out the demand
curve it faces based on that chosen price. If Firm B chooses a price such that it becomes
the higher priced fIrm, it faces the part of the demand curve labeled Ct. Conversely, if
Firm B chooses a price that is below that of Finn A, it fInds itself on C 2• Graph 1 shows
the market demand curve (D) with the market quantity (QM). As shown previously, if the
two firms are priced the same (PH equals PL), the market quantity is divided evenly, each
fum receiving one-half of the market quantity (lf2 QM).

Adding in the convenience

function (C), the higher priced finn sets its price at P L + C and thus lose business
according to the modifIed demand curve. Similarly, if the lower priced fIrm sets its price
at PH - C, it increases market output because it now has the market-clearing price (below
P A). Should Firm B choose a price below Firm A's price, the market quantity demanded
increases above

QM

as dictated by the lower price (C 2 extends along the demand curve

once the two intersect). C 1 and C2 are associated with the exponential difference function
(equation 3.4).

Specifically, the shape of the C curve is a direct result of the

redistribution of quantity due to the exponential difference function.
P

E[PA ] 1 - - - - 1

Me t----+----<:...----""'-.

Q
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This accounts for the failure in the previous models that assumed away brand loyalty and
other decisions based on conveniences. It makes the assumption more realistic - if the
difference in the price of gas is greater than five cents per gallon, the higher priced firm
will be hard pressed to receive any business. This break point of five cents per gallon is
one of the assumptions of the model. The brand loyally that was factored into the Simon,
Puig, and Aschoff model is incorporated here. The preference functions for consumers
include brand loyalty and other strong preferences such as clean facilities, and station
specific features such as Mobil Speed Pass. For most items, brand loyalty is not so strong
as to overcome a significantly higher price. There is no longer the need to incorporate
the lagged effect of previous period's output into the model because the utility function is
partially a function of brand loyalty.
The basic dynamics of the duopoly model are unchanged. In a one shot game, the
best solution is the price that maximizes profit while guaranteeing business.

In the

Bertrand model, this occurs when price is equal to marginal cost. Given the assumption
that the firm charging the lower price receives all the business, choosing a price above
marginal cost allows for the possibility of being undercut.

In this model, a similar

dynamic is present. Like in Bertrand, prices are forced down due to the threat of being
undercut. Prices do not fall all the way to marginal cost because of the ability to receive
business even though the finn's price may not be the [ower price.

The one shot

equilibrium can be found by selecting the price that maximizes profits if the other firm
chooses a price equal to marginal cost (the lowest price making non-negative profits).
This would be the lowest reasonable price for a firm

to

set (predatory pricing is not a

viable option in a one shot game and thus is ignored here). Graph 2 shows Firm B's
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make positive profit. In Graph 2, a price above marginal cost will yield Firm B a profit.
This firm is therefore the higher priced firm, so the profit equation is now

The profit-maximizing price is found by maximizing the above profit function.

This

price occurs where the first derivative is zero. Therefore

d1ti
dP*1

=

d P~'Q_ + p~. dQi - Me. dQ 1 = 0
1

1

l

dP*

dP*

1

3.7

l

Solving for Pi· will yield the profit-maximizing price. or Bertrandesque solution? Qj. is
the quantity that Firm B will sell for that period if it choose Pi· as its price. It is important
to note that this is not a pure Nash equilibrium.

4

Because of the narure of the quantity

difference function, there is an incentive to lower prices to p', and an incentive to raise
prices at or below p',

There is a finite range from Me to just above Pi' where

participants will not escape if they continue to compete. This is due to the nature of the
market. The ability to have a higher priced firm that still receives business drives the
incentive to raise price at or below p., The higher priced finn wil1 still receive business
and show a profit. At a price above p., there is an incentive to undercut rather than raise
prices further (in a one shot game) because a much larger percentage of the market can be
achieved enabling greater profits.
The long run dynamics of the model are defined by the underlying game theory
for decisions that players must make when determining the price for the next period. The
players decide whether to raise, lower, or keep their price the same (see nine-quadrant
game matrix below).
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Player 1

Lower Price

Same Price

Raise Price

Lower Price
Player 2

Same Price

Values of Profit for Each Decision

Raise Price

Players make this decision within the context of what their opponent might choose. The
multi-period decision process becomes a nine-quadrant game where each competitor can
raise, lower, or keep its price the same, When players are competing, each will choose
their best response for what price to set from the nine-quadrant game,S Much as in the
Prisoner's Dilemma (presented in Chapler I), each player detennines his or her expected
profits in the next round depending on what decision he or she might make and what
decision the opponent might make. Each player then chooses his or her best response for
each possible choice of his or her opponent. From the perspective of the second player
(the opponent), the second player can see what choice the first player will make and pick
his or her best response. This results in the Nash equilibrium solution, which helps to
determine the Bertrandesque solution. Making this into a multi-period game also brings
in the dynamics of an infinite horizon game and the model is subject to the dynamjcs
inherent in such games,
The long-term dynamics of the model differ from the traditional conclusions of
both Cournot and Bertrand. The infinite horizon model stresses that in a repeated game,
there is a collusive equilibrium (the same value in all of the models) but it can be reached
in this model of duopoly even without explicit collusion. In finitely repeated games,
theory dictates that each player should "cheat" in the final round in order to increase his
or her market share and eam a larger profit.

Subsequently, to try and beat out an
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opponent, each player cheats in the second-to-last round. In order to avoid this, each
player then cheats in the third-to-last round and so on and so forth until the best decision
for each player is to cheat in the first round of play - the Benrandesque solution would
result.

In an infinitely repeated game, however, there is the possibility of a different

dynamic altogether. Because neither player knows when the last round will occur. there
is no incentive to cheat earlier and earlier because in every subsequent round, the
opponent will cheat and both players will lose out on the profits made possible only
through collusion. As long as the number of rounds remains infinite in the minds of the
players, once they find the collusive price, there is no incentive to move away from the
collusive price for fear of punishment.
The collusive equilibrium is found in the same manner as in Bertrand and Cournot
(Figure 3.2 shows the collusive equilibrium relative to the competitive and Cournot
solutions). The point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost determines the profit
maximizing price and quantity for the market. The market is then divided in half and
each competitor serves half the market. The marginal revenue (MR.) curve is defined as

P = PMAX - 2'M'Q
Setting this equal to marginal cost (MC) defines the collusive market quantity (Qc).
Therefore,

QC = PWl,X - Me

3.8

2·M
This. by definition, yields the collusive price (pc) at which both firms operate

3.9
The dynamics of the model allow for both strict competition (Benrandesque solution) as
well as collusive behavior. While Cournot and Bertrand discount the possibility of the
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collusive equilibrium being attained, both theories acknowledge the possibility of the
collusive equilibrium. The anecdotal evidence supports collusion as a possible outcome
(if not at pC then at some arbitrary price above the Benrandesque solution).

The

experiment needs to show that these solutions are possible in order to substantiate the
claim that consumers are willing to pay a premium for services or saved opportunity cost,
that their decision is not based purely on the price at the pump, and subsequently that the
distribution of the market is not solely dependent on the lowest priced firm.

3.4 Gas Station Duopoly Experiment
The new assumptions and model outlined

In

the prevlOus section present an

interesting opportunity to explore experimentation. In this case, the assumptions of an
existing theory have been revised to account for a recognized inconsistency between
observations and theory. The experiment provides a chance to explore the dynamjcs of
the revised model and to draw conclusions about the suitability of the new assumptions.
The previous section highlighted the inconsistency between observed consumer
and firm behavior and the theories of Bertrand and Cournot.

Some of the anecdotal

evidence as to why consumers would purchase the same gas from the higher priced
station presented earlier focuses on the conveniences between gas stations such as a
Mobil SpeedPass or avoiding the opportunity cost of crossing the road. A considerable
number of other examples can be thought of, including access to clean restrooms, the
availability of a convenience store, and the ability to use a credit card to name a few.
Adopting a new assumption that consumers are willing to pay to have access to an
increased number of goods brings a more realistic sense to consumer decision-making.

60
The ability for firms to make game theoretic decisions removes the obvious
falsehood of the assumption that a competing finn will not change output or price levels
regardless of another firm's actions. The addition of game theory presents a mechanism
to incorporate finn pricing decisions. It also orchestrates the long term dynamic that
parallels finn decision making more closely than the existing theories. The explanatory
power that the new assumptions bring to duopoly theory is to close Lhe existing gap
between observed behavior and theory.

3.4.1

Experiment Design
The research question for this experiment is to examine the modifications to the

initial set of assumptions for duopolies outlined in the previous section. The market
dynamics of a gas station duopoly will be examined. If the results from the experiment
reflect the modified model, then the revised premises, that form the foundation for the
model not only more closely replicate reality but also add value to the theory.
The environment faced by participants is that each is a gas station owner with the
responsibility of setting the price for regular gas each morning. The only information
that the owner has is the cost of the gas to the station and that there are no fixed costs.
The owner has no information regarding the market demand function. The differentiation
between the two firms is done by consumers (and not specified in the experiment) and is
incorporated into the demand and differencing functions presented earlier.

Owners

observe consumer behavior and their opponent's prices and react accordingly. Appendix
3.1 displays the instructions that each player sees.
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The experiment was computerized for ease of calculations, uniformity amongst
competitors, and ease of transferability around campus (it was a web application). It
allowed the participants to read through and have easy access to instructions at all times
as well as allowed players to move through the different rounds quickly (as opposed to
lengthy hand calculations between rounds). It also enabled easy collection of the data
and control of the environment. It prevented the participants from communicating with
each other or pairing themselves up in such a way that it would alter the results of the
study. To aid in this, the computer randomly paired participants as they logged in to the
application.
Motivation was one of the important variables discussed in the methods section as
well as earlier in this chapter. If the players are not compelled to act in the same manner
as the economic participant he or she is simulating (a gas station owner), then the player
will not operate in the same way and the results will hold no meaning. Reproducing the
same motivations for the players as the economic participants face is imperative to an
ex.periment's success. In this case, the player must act like a gas station owner and try to
maximize profits. In order to persuade partiCipants to act in this manner, part of their
compensation was tied to their performance.

Each player received two dollars for

participating as a base payout. The remainder of a participant'S payout was one and a
half percent of the participant earned profits during the experiment. This motivated each
player to do as well as possible, as each player's own interests were tied to his or her
perfOImance. The expected running time of the experiment was thirty minutes and the
expected payout was over four dollars, a level above the hourly wage they could receive
at the college.
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The procedures for the experiment are included in Appendix 3.2. Each player had
to read and accept an informed consent form (Appendix 3.3). This signified that the
participants were playing of their own free will. Players were provided the instructions,
as well as given the opportunity to have questions answered. Once all questions were
answered, the players were instructed to begin the experiment. Given only the previous
information about cost, each player had to detennine his or her first price.

For

subsequent rounds, players were also informed of any profits earned that day and what
their opponent chose

fOT

a price. Players then set prices for subsequent days and the

game proceeded for an unknown number of rounds. One added capacity that each player
has is to review the prices and profit levels for each previous round.
Before the end of the experiment, participants were asked to fill out a fonn that
collected data (major; minor; age; gender; graduation year; state or country of residence)
as well as asked them questions about why they chose their prices (how did you choose
your first price?; how did you choose your second price?; how well do you think you did
compared to your opponent?). This allowed for some insight into the decision-making
logic of the hypothetical owners. While this bears no statistical significance, its adds to
the circumstantial evidence regarding firm behavior.
The parameters for the experiment were assigned in order to accommodate the
goals of approximate payout and so that participants could not easily figure out the
market demand function.

They were also chosen for their realistic connotations.

Participants were all informed that their marginal cost for gasoline was $1.50.

The

demand function had a P MAX of $1.90, a realistic current maximum for the price of gas in
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New England. The slope, M, was set at -0.001, for every penny the price of gasoline
dropped, 10 more gallons of gasoline were demanded.
Given these parameters, the equilibrium points defined in (he first section can be
calculated.

Recall that the Bertrandesque solution (equation 3.7) is determined by

solving the first derivative of the profit function for Pi". Given the parameters, Pi·

= 1.53

(solved numericalll). Readers are reminded that this is not a pure Nash equilibrium, but
that once prices approach this price, they remain within a few pennies of it as long as the
players are competing and not colluding. The collusive equilibrium was defined to be the
profit maximizing price and quantity for the market. This quantity (Qc) and price (pc)
are calculated to be QC

= 200 (from equation

3.8) and pC = $1.70 (from equation 3.9)

respectively. This quantity is split between the two players if they are both operating at
(he collusive price.

3.4.2

Data
A total of twenty-six pairs (fifty two participants) were collected from (his

experiment. The experiment was conducted at Colby College, a highly selective, smaJl,
liberal arts college in New England. Thiny-nine percent of participants were female. A
wide variety of majors were represented in the study, though economics was the
predominant maJor.

Participation in the experiment was completely voluntary.

Promotion for the experiment occurred through classroom announcements by professors,
postings, sign up sheets, and public announcements.
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3.4.3

Results
The results describe a similar dynamic to the one presented in the theory section.

While competitors initially chose a wide range of prices over the course of the game,
many participants engaged in competitive behavior consistent with the Bertrandesque
prediction. There is also evidence that players were colluding, able to mainlain a price
above the Bertrandesque solution. The following analysis reflects that participants either
competed (and thus fell to the Bertrandesque solution) or colluded (were able to maintain
a price above the Bertrandesque solution) after some period of learning.
The first technique used to analyze the data was to graph the scaner plots for the
prices chosen by participants in each round. This enabled a simple regression to be fitted
showing the general trend of the data. It also enabled the tracing out of clusters of prices.
Through inspection, it was possible to show that one group of participants chose prices
around the Bertrandesque solution while another group moved towards a collusive
solution. While the collusive solution was deterrnjned to be pC

= 1.70 earlier in

this

section, any price different from (and above) the Bertrandesque solution is a price
competitors must cooperate (or collude) to achieve (A price of $1.60, for example).
Graph 3 shows the scatter plot for prices by round.
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data separate, a second technique is used. The distribution of prices in each round is
graphed to determine if there is any substantive split in the frequency that each price is
chosen.

A second important consideration is the extent that the pairs of data move

together (regardless of solution). Showing this is necessary for any conclusion regarding
the assumptions underlying duopoly theory (there is no meaning to one player operating
in the competing group with the other in the colluding group). The two solution curves in
the Graph 4 represent the peaks of the distribution curve. As the rounds progress, the
peaks should split, one for the Bertrandesque solution (the lower prices) the other moving
towards the collusive equilibrium (the higher prices). The separation need only show that
there is some collusion supporting some price above the Bertrandesque solution, not
necessarily at the collusive price (pc). Appendix 3.5 displays the distribution curves for
all twelve rounds. The first and twelfth rounds are shown below.
oa_ _ ,z
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The first round (left graph) displays a wide range of prices chosen by competitors. A
large group of these (20) are below $1.60. By the twelfth round (right graph), there is a
large cluster of prices below $1.70 (all but four).

There also appears to be some

clustering of prices. It is clear that there is a break around $1.59, below which is one
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collusion. This occurs without the benefit of communication based solely on what the
players learned about each other.
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Graph 6 shows that the average difference in price approaches three cents. From this it
can be concluded that the opponents cannot be in both the Bertrandesque and collusive
regions simultaneously. The average difference in prices between competitors becomes
smaller as the rounds progress so that as the solutions separate, it becomes unfeasible to
be simultaneously in both solution regions. Graph 7 shows the variance in the average
difference in prices approaching zero in round six. This provides funher evidence that
the prices are moving together. There is now sufficient evidence to conclude that each
set of opponents (pair) move together. The question of whether or not there is a split of
the pairs into groups - one group competing, the other group colluding, remains as the
final piece to be addressed.
Using the frequency distribution of the average price for each pair. the hypothesis
that the pairs split into two distinct groups is confirmed if a significant difference exists
between the two peaks of the resulting binomial distribution. It has been shown that the
prices within each pair approach each other in the last six periods, so it follows that the
average price for each pair is representative of the pair's price relative to marginal cost.
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II is expected that the binomial distribution will result with one peak representing the

Benrandesque solution the other the collusive solution (at some price above the
Benrandesque solution).
In order to show that the two peaks are different from one another, each of the
average prices for each pair must be separated into a Bertrandesque group and a collusive
group. These groups must then be tested to determine if any statistical difference exists.
The first step in separating the data is

to

ensure that the observations for each round are

kept as a set for each pair of participants. Graphs 6 and 7 show that the pairs of prices
converge between the fifth and sixth rounds.

From looking at the graphs. it appears as

though round six is the "breaking point," the round in which learning seems to be
complete enough that prices for each pair converge and the decision to compete or
collude has been made. For completeness, two models of the groups are created. The
data are frozen in order to keep the set of observations together. The sets are then soned
by the sixth round (the break point round). The first eleven sets of observations are then
grouped as the "lower" group and the final twelve observations grouped as the "higher"
group. Each of these groups makes up Model I.

In order for collusion to exist, the

separation must be significant by the final round. Model II follows a similar process but
sorts the data according to the prices in the final (twelfth) round. Each model is then
examined to determine if a breaking point exists. It is the existence of a breaking point
that confirms a statistical difference in the groups and subsequently in the solutions.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix 3.6 show the results of the two models. The t
7

statistic for each round is given. Using the critical values with 22 degrees of freedom, it
is clear that by round 5 and round 8 (respective to each model) enough learning has taken
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place lhal the prices for each pair of opponents have converged, and they have begun to
either collude or compete. The t-statistic for round five in Model I is 1.790 (significant at
the five percent., one-tailed level of significance). The interpretation is that in round five.
a statistically significant difference exists between the mean prices in each of the groups.
Similarly, the t-statistic for round eight in Model

rr

is 2.089 (significant at the five

percent level for a one-tailed test) reflecting the same thing.

It is now possible to

conclude that there is a statistically significant difference in the means (peaks of the
binary distribution) at that point, implying that there are two distinct groups of players;
one set competes, the other set colludes to maintain a price above the Berrrandesque
solution.
A regression analysis was perlormed on the data as an additional test of whether
or not there was a collusive equilibrium different from the Bertrandesque equilibrium.
The regression (Model ill) was run with the average price for each pair of opponents as
the dependent variable.

The explanatory variables are ROUND, COLLUDE, and

BOTHECON. ROUND is a time variable. The expected sign on ROUND is negative or
zero. As the rounds progress, competition should develop and prices should fall. Prices
cannot fall below the Bertrand solution (marginal cost), so it is possible that they are
constant (coefficient equal to zero). COLLUDE is a binary variable set equal to one if
the average price for a pair is greater than $1.59 in the current period and the two periods
prior.

$1.59 is defined to be a significantly different price from the predicted

Berrrandesque solution of $1.54. The lagged component ensures that the pair has been
above this price sufficiently long that they are colluding (not a random price difference
that pulls the average above $1.59 for one period). The variable is set equal to zero
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otherwise. The expected sign on COLLUDE is positive, as colluding should shift the
price up. BOTHECON is a binary variable equal to one if both players in the pair are
economics majors. It is set equal to zero otherwise. The expected sign on BOTHECON
is positive. It is positive because of the possibility that economics majors may have
learned that in a duopoly there are ways to earn greater profits than by competing.
The results of the regression can be found in Appendix 3.8.

The regression

applies to a twelve-round game. The first round is eliminated because it is random and it
is impossible for colluding to have occurred in the first round. The sign on ROUND is
negative and significant. As each round progresses. the average price tends to fall just
under a penny. The sign on COLLUDE is positive and significant. If the players are
colluding, they can expect to have an average price fifteen cents higher than if they did
not collude. The sign on BOTHECON is positive and significant. If both players are
economics majors, they tend to have an average price that is five cents above pairs that
are not both economics majors.

The COLLUDE variable is most significant to the

discussion of collusion. COLLUDE was found to be positive and significant and to have
a magnirude of about fifteen cents. The interpretation is that those whom colluded were
able to keep theif prices fifteen cents higher than those that competed. The expected
difference in the Bertrandesque solution price and the collusive price was sixteen cents
(pc

= $1.70 and Pi· = $1.54).

The regression results add further credibility to the claim

that there is the possibility for gasoline station owners to collude even without direct
communication.
The final detennination is whether or not the Bertrandesque solution is different
from the Bertrand solution.

It is important to show that the equilibrium is above
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Bertrand's prediction; otherwise, the only result is that collusion is possible in an infinite
horizon game. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 in Appendix 3.6 show the extent

(0

which the lower

group differs from the Bertrand solution of price equal to marginal cost ($1.50). Both
models show that by the tenth round, the Bertrandesque group is operating at a
statistically different price from $1.50. It now suffices to say that there are two solutions,
a Bertrandesque and a collusive, and that the Bertrandesque solution is different from the
solution proposed by Bertrand.

3.4.4

Conclusions
The results section determined that there was clear evidence of the Bertrandesque

solution as well as the beginning of a split off towards the collusive equilibrium. Some
participants found a way to maintain a price above the Bertrandesque solution, beginning
to approach the collusive solution. The existence of a breaking point in each of the
models justifies the existence of two solutions.
Some structural problems for the experiment also exist that influenced the results.
It was not possible to make the game truly infinite.

Players knew from the time

constraint that the game had to end sometime and could begin to "guess" when they
believed the game was coming to an end. Subsequently, players began to act as though it
were a finitely repeated game. Many participants played concurrently in the same room.
As other participants started finishing, it was possible to detect this and players started to
question how many rounds were left in their own game. The results reflect this. In some
of the later rounds there is some "cheating" from the collusi ve prices as people guess that
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the game is almost over and drop their price. [rrespective of this, there is still evidence
from the distributions that the groups split into upper and lower regions.
The clustering of the pairs of prices in each of the groups brings credibility to the
underlying assumptions of the theory.

The fact that the pairs remain close together,

regardless of the group they are in, establishes that if the set of pairs as a whole develop a
trend, that the pairs follow that trend together. The existence of the split in the groups
verifies the claim that the dynamics hypothesized by the theory are possible.
have the ability to co))ude or compete.

Players

It is therefore possible to conclude that the

players in this game operated in a manner consistent with the assumptions of duopoly
behavior.

The more complex set of assumptions are more reasonable then previous

theories. The end result is that the experimental results support the prescribed dynamics
of duopolies so that the underlying assumptions are not only fit with the real-world better
but also that they improve the foundations of duopoly theory.
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Appendix 3.1
Instructions
You are a gas station manager and have been designated the responsibility of setting the
price for unleaded gas for each business day. The station you work for is competing
against another identical station located across the street. Once set, you cannot change the
chosen price until the close of business. You can set the price at any level you choose. At
the end of each day you will be given the opportunity to change your price for the
following day.
The computer will randomly pair you with another individual. You do not have any
contact with this individual during the game. The computer will tell you what price they
choose and whether or not you made a profit.
There are several things to note. In the upper right hand comer are two boxes, I and H.
By clicking on I, you can view the game instructions at any time. By clicking on H, you
can view your and your opponent's past price selections. bI the upper left hand comer is a
box that will display your cumulative profits for the game.

In order to motivate you, you will be given a percentage of all profits you earn during the
course of the study. The computer will keep track of the results on the screen for you.
To help you choose what price
station:
•
•

to

set, you know the following information about your

It costs the station $1.50 for each gallon of gas purchased
The owner owns the gas station outright and has no outstanding debts

If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
Continue with DPCE.
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Appendix 3.2

ExpenunentPTocedures
StudentS are asked to sit anywhere lhey want (24 maximum per session).
Once everyone is sealed,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in today's study. The study will be
completely computerized, but you may use scrap paper as you wish. From now
until the end of the experiment, please refrain from holding conversations with your
neighbors. To begin, please open up Internet Explorer and insert the following link:
www.colby.eduJeconomics/project
Once you have entered the link, please wait for further instructions.
Once everyone has the first screen up,

Please go ahead and insert your Colby username and password as indicated on the
screen. Press enter when ready.
Pause as the participants enter their information.

Be sure to read all of the instructions carefully. They will be available to you during
the game. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will answer them.
Pause for a full minute to allow them to read the instructions carefully.
Once everyone is ready,

If there are no more questions, please press "Continue with DPCE" which will take
you to the informed consent form. After reading the form, press'Accept' and begin
the experiment. Once you have fInished the experiment, be sure to print out your
totals screen. Do not close your browser at any time. Again, if you have any
questions, please raise your hand and we will answer them for you. When you have
fInished the experiment, please wait quietly for everyone to fmish.
Once everyone has completed the experiment.

Thank you for participating in this study. Please be sure that you have completed
the form and printed out the summary page. We will now call you out by name to
come and be paid for your participation. Please wait quietly while we complete this
process. Thank you again for your help.
Begin calling out names and paying the participants.
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Appendix 3.3
Informed Consent Form

Title of Study: Price Competition Between Two Firms With Homogenous Products
Person In Charge:
Albert Goodman
Colby College
This study is designed to investigate how people, when acting as the owner of a firm, set
prices over time when in direct competition with one other firm. If you agree to take part
in this research, you will be asked to compete against one other person.
Your participation in this study will take approximately 60 minutes. The amount of
money that you earn in this study will depend on the decisions that you and the other
person make.
There is no deception anywhere in this srudy. What you are told is going on is exactly
what is going on.
The experimenter is on hand in order that you may ask questions about the research
procedures and so that these questions will be answered. Your participation in this
research is confidential. Only the person in charge will have access to your identity and to
information that can be associated with your identity. No record will be kept matching
your name with your code number, so your information and performance in the
experiment is anonymous even to the experimenter. In the event of publication of this
research, no personally identifying information will be disclosed. To make sure your
participation is confidential, only a code number will be used to identify you;
furthennore, your name will not be used. Further, your partiCipation is voluntary. You are
free to stop participating in the research at any time or to decline to answer any specific
questions without penalty. Finally, this study involves minimal risks; that is, no risks to
your physical or mental health beyond those encountered in the normal course of every
day life.
By clicking on 'Accept' below you are verifying the following:
I agree to participate in a scientific investigation of price competition in a two-firm
market. I understand the above information and I have received answers to any questions
I may have about the research procedure. I understand and agree to the conditions of this
study as described. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and
that I may withdraw from this study at any time by notifying the person in charge. Finally
I certify that I am at least 18 years of age and that to the best of my knowledge I have no
physical or mental illness that would increase the risk to me of participation in the study.
Accept
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Appendix 3.4
On Screen Displays for Experiment
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Appendix 3.5
Distribution of Prices, By Round
Distribution: Round 1
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Distribution: Round 3
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Appendix 3.6

Figure 3.1
Model II: Dala Sorted by Prices of Sixth Round
Round Mean (Lower)

1
2
3
5
6
7
8

1.7409
1.6595
1.6155
1.5918
1.5536
1.5332
1.5655
1.5673

9

1.5723

10
11
12

1.5659
1.5627
1.5673

4

S.E.

Mean (Higher)

S.E.

I-Statistic

0.3750
0.2858
0.2175
0.1957

1.8738
1.6804

0.1536

1.8363
1.7663

0.3597
0.1025
0.0961
0.1994
0.5227
0.2800
0.0680
0.0693
0.0705
0.0912
0.0797
0.0890

0.865
0.229
0.397
1.136
1.790·
2.829"

0.0525
0.0933
0.0733
0.0725
0.0411
0.0357
0.0415

1.6438
1.6854

1.6413

1.6358
1.6317
1.6446
1.6333
1.6321

• Signifiganl at the five percent, one-tailed level
•• Signifiganl at Ihe one percent, one-tailed level

2.210~

2.300'
1.990'
2.703'·
2.779·'
2.267"
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Figure 3.2
Model II: Data Sorted by Prices of Twelfth Round
Round Mean (Lower)

S.E.

Mean (Higher)

S.E.

t-Statistic

1

1.7891

0.3669

1.8296

0.3785

0.260

2

1.6882

0.2819

1.6542

0.1103

-0.375

3

1.6459

0.2154

1.6158

0.0999

-0.423

4

1.6168

0.1961

1.6625

0.2076

0.543

5

1.7186

0.5391

1.6850

0.2676

-0.187

6

1.5823

0.1648

1.7213

0.2729

1.492

7

1.5759

0.0973

1.6317

0.0728

1.545

8

1.5700

0.0736

1.6333

0.0716

2.089~

9
10

1.5705
1.5577

0.0713

1.6333

0.0700

2.131'

0.0370

1.6521

0.0848

3.506"

11

1.5532

0.0277

1.6421

0.0725

3.944~~

12

1.5468

0.0197

1.6508

0.0754

4.609"

" Signifigant at the five percent, one-tailed level
n

Signifigant at the one percent, one-tailed level
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FIgure 3.3
Model I: Data Sorted by Prices of Sixth Round
Test for Difference from Bertrand Solution (Me

=$1.50)

Round

Mean (Lower)

S.E.

t-Statistic

1

1.7409

0.3750

0.642

2

1.6595

0.2858

0.558

3

1.6155

0.2175

0.531

4

1.5918

0.1957

0.469

5

1.5536

0.1536

0.349

6

1.5332

0.0525

0.631

7

1.5655

0.0933

0.702

8

1.5673

0.0733

0.918

9

1.5723

0.0725

0.997

10

1.5659

0.0411

1.604"

11

1.5627

0.0357

1.759

12

1.5673

0.0415

1.621"

" Significant at the ten percent, one-tailed level
"" Significant at the five percent. one-tailed level

89

Figure 3.4
Model II: Data Sorted by Prices of Twelfth Round
Test for Difference from Bertrand Solution (Me = $1.50)

Mean (Lower)

S.E.

t-Statistic

1.7891

0.3669

0.788

2

1.6882

0.2819

0.668

3

1.6459

0.2154

0.677

4

1.6168

0.1961

0.596

5

1.7186

0.5391

0.406

6

1.5823

0.1648

0.499

7

1.5759

0.0973

0.780

8

1.5700

0.0736

0.951

9

1.5705

0.0713

0.988

10

1.5577

0.0370

1.559~

11

1.5532

0.0277

1.921'·

12

1.5468

0.0197

2.382-

Round

~

Significant at the ten percent, one-tailed level

•• Significant at the five percent, one-tailed level
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Appendix 3.7

Model III
Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Average Price for a Pail of Players
Sample (Adjusted): 254
Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Probability

C

1.6174

0.0277

58.3538

0.0000

ROUND

-0.0089

0.0033

-2.7186

0.0070

COLLUDE

0.1469

0.0226

6.5082

0.0000

BOTHECON

0.0550

0.0208

2.6443

0.0087

Adjusted R-squared

0.1717

F-statistic

18.4837

Variable
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Notes
1

Kahn, p. 2

2

Kahn, p. 3

This equation is not solvable for Pi" algebraically; it must be determined numerically or
graphically

3

A nine quadrant game outlines the process by which each player decides whether to
raise, lower, or keep his or her price the same based on their best response (extension of
Duua, p. 11)

4

5

RecaJlthat:

d1ti = dP~.Q. + p=". dQi - Me. dQ i = 0
dP*
I
1
1 dP*
dP'*'i
1

1

Solving numerically with the given parameters yields Pi"
6

Srudenrnund,p. 607

=$1.53

CHAPTER 4

Reflections on Experimental Economics

"It is an exhilarating time to do experimental economics."
- Alvin E. Roth
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One of the principle concerns of any research project is the experience gained
from the completion of it. Having spent the better pan of a year working on this project,
the final chapter is dedicated to reflecting on the role of experimental economics within
Ihe discipline of economics, as well as some comments on the project. The fIrst section
discusses the role of experimentation, identifying some of the criticisms and weaknesses,
but concluding that the addition of this technique to economics enhances the explanatory
power and functionality of economic theories. The second section focuses on the process
of a project of this magnitude.

4.1 Experimentation and Economics
The addition of experimentation as a tool for economists has been met with some
contention.

Many economists believe that the experimental environment fabricates

results. essentially data rn.ining the conclusions in support of the economists' claims. A
considerable amount of this project was concerned with understanding experimentation
as it pertains to economics. Therefore it is important to address and resolve this question.

In doing so, it is imperative as an experimenter to review the experiment for possible
shortcomings and possible avenues for further research. Detennining the impact of the
shortcomings will influence the power of the results. This discussion will help improve
future duopoly experiments.
The questions concerning the validity of experimentation as a viable method for
performing economic tests led Alvin Roth to write "Lets Keep the Can Out of
ExperimentaJ Econ.: A Methodological Note" in 1994. Two important points Roth raises
are that experimentalists must accurately and completely report their data. If they clean
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their data

to

any large extent, the reasoning for this needs to be clear in the published

work so that other economists can detennine if the data cleaning affected the end results.
The second point Roth calls "guarding against self deception." As an experimenter looks
to analyze the results, he or she must proceed carefully to reach a conclusion that is
supported by the data. The careful treatment of data and interpretation of results with a
blind eye to the desired results are important steps to bring credibility to the area.
One of the common criticisms of experimentation is that experiments are by
nature set up to succeed. The design of experiments yields the author's intended result.

An experiment cannot "fail" unless the experimenter commits errors in devising the
experiment. Critics explain that this is due to the control mechanism. COnlrol allows the
experimenter to establish the underpinnings of the economic principle under examination.
Control enables the experimenter to define the output in such a way that the variables he
or she wishes to extract are easily observed. Given the experimenter has control over the
inputs and the form the outputs take, an experiment by definition reflects the author's
preconceived notions for what conclusions the results should support.
Empirical economists argue that economic models are developed through
theoretical decisions and then evaluated and analyzed using outside evidence.

The

accuracy of (he model rests in how well the data reflect the proposed model's predictions.
The empirical evidence comes from real world data and (he economist has little ability
control the fonn it takes.

to

The empirical economist is charged with the task of

determining how well the data fit the model for the economic event, having little to do
with the actual data collection.
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While the observations regarding the uses of control are correct, the conclusion
that experiments by definition fabricate results is not. The critique of control highlights
the need for careful experimentation. It is worth noting that an empirical economist can
data mme results just as easily as an experimental economist can fabricate results.
Declaring that all experimental data are tainted would be just as unsubstantiated as
determining that all empirical results are equally falsified.

The capability that

experimentation adds is that economists can now create economic events in a laboratory.
It is then possible to collect data that might be unobservable under real world scenarios or
obtain additional data to compliment existing evidence.

It is the ability to collect

different variables or specific variations on existing variables that makes experimentation
so valuable. Like any science that is not purely theoretical, it is possible to fabricate
results; it is only through careful consideration of experiment designs and parameters that
this is avoided.
Regarding the criticism that experimentalists design their experiments to produce
the desired outcome, there are a few key points that critics overlook. Experimentalists
document their procedures, designs, and parameters very thoroughly. This enables other
economists to examine the experiment as a whole and possibly to rerun the study.
Subsequenl1y, other economists are able to determine whether or not the results were
established under false pretenses. Much of the work of the experimenter is to design an
experiment such that the environment is accurately replicated and that the desired data
are collectable but not predetermined. The second impoJ1ant element of experiments is
that they do not.explicitly set out to prove a theory. The environment established by the
experimenter represents the environment of the economy. Players placed in that situation
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act as a participant in the actual economy. Experiments test whether or not participants
act according to the underlying assumptions of the model through comparison of the
results with the model's predictions. Conclusive experiments observe participants acting
in a manner consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory while using
parameters that do not force the results.
Criticisms that revolve around the experimenter assuming too much about the
market may also be inaccurate. The experimenter takes a theoretical model and then tests
10

see if the assumptions are correct. In the case of the experiment presented in this

paper, the researcher thought that the underlying principles of a duopoly market were
different from existing theory.

The experiment hypothesized that the revised set of

assumptions would result in a similar but different dynamic than previous models
suggested.

The experiment was designed to test whether or not the revised set of

assumptions would lead the participants to act in a manner similar to the original theory.
The revised set of assumptions more closely paralleled consumer behavior.

If firm

behavior reflected a similar dynamic, then the revised assumptions hold merit.
While this is a slight distinction, it is an important one. Some economists spend a
great deal of energy arguing that experimental evidence should not be included as a way
to verify economic theories. Experimental data are not designed to validate the theories
per se but the assumptions that form the foundation for the theories. Theory dictates that
a specific set of actions will occur under a set of circumstances. Experimental evidence
shows that a set of actions can occur under this given set of circumstances.
Experimenters acknowledge that it is a possible set of actions.
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Understanding that experimentalists are merely trying to show that a set of actions
can develop from a set of assumptions neutralizes much of this criticism. The elements
of control that the experimentalist employs are aimed at establishing the same set of
assumptions. As the experiment is set in motion, the results fallout and the experimenter
is left to determine if these are similar to theoretic predictions. If they are, then the
assumptions underlying the theory are characteristic of the market participants. It does
not unconditionally validate the theory. This slight but important counters the criticisms
that experimentalists are able to validate theories through fabricated results. Over time,
the unwarranted criticisms of experimental economics will fade and experimentation will
serve as an invaluable tool in an economists' arsenal.
Writing a chapter devoted to thinking about the project enables the review of
work for systematic mistakes. Most of the mistakes are due to a lack of experience in
running experiments. This is magnified by the use of a computer to run the program.
The duopoly experiment was successful in many ways, as an economics experiment and
as a learning instrument. In hindsight, the number of rounds chosen and the ability for
partiCipants to turn the infinite game into a finite game were design flaws in the
experiment. The addition of the computerization of the experiment aided the experiment
tremendously but also presented challenges.
The number of rounds chosen was twelve. From running computer simulations of
the model, it seemed that the expected pattern should develop before the tenth round.
Given the limited budget and the desire

to

maintain the maximum capacity for

participants, the decision was made to restrict the rounds to twelve. It was believed that
many competitors would reveal their strategy by then. It also was thought that it would
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help cunail the time the game would take.

In the end, the results begin to show a

distinction between the two equilibria, but more rounds would have helped to determine
if the collusive price would be reached.
A second design error occurred when working to make the game infinite in
nature.

College students are impatient and needed to know how long the experiment

would take. This imposed a time limit making the game finite. The need to have many
participanrs in the room at the same time was imponant for randomness of the pairings
but worked against the infinite horizon game. As some players finished. others realized
the game would soon end and any remaining infinite horizon mindset was lost. While
there is no significant evidence that participants altered their behavior on account of the
finite nature of the experiment. it was a problem that was not anticipated when
detennining the experimental procedures and is worth consideration from any future
experiments involving multi-period game theoretic models.
The computer program made the experiment significantly easier to run while
providing only a few technical problems. Not having to calculate all of the different
profits for each participant for each round saved a considerable amount of time. It made
the game run smoothly, kept the running time short, enabled the adjustment of parameters
in the test phase, and assisted in other important methodological concerns of the
experiment, such as lack of communication and randomness of pairing. Some difficulties
included the unique nature of the program, as well as the complex coding that made it
difficult to debug. Several rounds of pilot tests were done to ensure matching and that
the program would not crash once the trials began. While the program certainly worked
very well during the experiment, the process of debugging and testing the program added
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a twist that was not anticipated when the decision to computerize the experiment was first
made.
A final note on experiment3tion lies in the available resources.

It is precisely

because experimentation is a relati vely new addition to the field of economics that those
wishing to engage in experimentation need as complete information as possible. The
following are a few indispensable resources for any economist thinking to add
experimentation in£O their research:

Davis and Holt (1993); Friedman and Sunder

(1994); Plott (1982); Kagel and Roth (1995); Roth (1987, 1988, 1993); Siakantaris
(2000); Smith (1989). Additionally, Vernon Smith has compiled a series of papers in
economics, of which the seventh volume focuses on experimental economics (Smith,
1990). These resources helped to initiate the process of learning about experimental
economics as well as developing a strategy for designing and running experiments.

4.2 Reflections on the Project
Any project to which a considerable amount of time is devoted deserves
reflection.

This project was embarked on for a number of reasons.

No course in

experimental economics currently is taught at Colby. Had there been a course, it might
not have offered the opponunity to develop an experiment at this level of detail. In terms
of the larger scheme, no such prospect really would present itself outside of a longer-term
commitment to the world of academia (graduate studies).

The researcher's level of

interest in experimentation grew significantly during the course of junior year, and the
ability to pursue an area of interest in this level of detail presented itself in the Senior
Scholar program.
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A long-tenn, self-directed project is the definitive fonn of self-education.

It

offers the ability to take the project in a direction that will maximize the experience. This
was certainly true in the case of this project. The initial moti vations for the project
emerged from work with Dr. Matthew Mulford of the London School of Economics. I
Much of this work was centered on negotiation theory but called upon economic theories
as well. In an effort to not simply replicate the past work, thoughts for this project turned
1O

economic theories encountered. over the past three years. The idea of examining price

differences in gas stations presented an appealing alternative to negotiation theory. After
some thought, it represented an interesting application of duopoly markets. After further
consideration, evidence about the market for gasoline showed that there were
inconsistencies between the assumptions of duopoly theory and the observed actions of
both consumers and finns. Seeing as these actions formed the underlying assumptions
for the theory, it made an excellent experiment topic.
The process of developing and thinking through the experimental process offered
the chance to deepen the knowledge of microeconomic and game theories. Exploring
experimental economics allowed for the surveying of literature in several subfields of
economics. The way game theory and experimental economics cut across many areas of
economics makes one step back and realize that each are a process for considering
economic events. Game theory helps to remodel economic theories using a different
underlying thought process for decision-making. Though very different, experiments and
econometrics

are

mechanisms

for studying and

evaluating economic

models.

Experimentation is a mechanism for learning about economic events rather than
ex.plaining them.
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There has been a considerable amount of discussion regarding the benefits to an
experimental component to economics throughout this paper. Physicists and chemists
have long used experiments to test theories. Economics has long tried to accomplish as
notable goals as physicists using only theories and outside evidence.

The increased

capabilities that experimentation brings to economics can now help to develop additional
resources for testing assumptions or to supplement existing data. The end result is richer
and better equipped theories.
The Senior Scholars project has presented a uruque opportunity to explore
experimental economics tn great detail.

Experimentation has been invaluable LO the

sciences for centuries and will now be a groundbreaking tool for economics. The process
of learning about economic behavior in a laboratory environment creates the possibility
for more refined, more potent economic theories. In short, the project has helped show
that experimentation is a worthwhile addition to economics. Experiments in economics,
as in any science, require clear, precise thinking and planning in order to develop work of
value to the discipline, but it is evident that experiments provide the ability to draw new
and more convincing inferences than ever possible with existing data.
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Notes
Project summarized in Mulford (2003)
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